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Abstract
We develop and apply a procedure to test the welfare implications of a
beauty and non-beauty contest based on survey forecasts of interest rates
and yields in a large country sample over an extended period of time. In
most countries, interest rate forecasts are unbiased and consistent with both
models, but are rarely supported by yield forecasts. In half of the countries,
a higher precision of public information regarding interest rates increases
welfare. During forward guidance, public information is less precise than
private information.
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1 Introduction
Information about relevant economic fundamentals is widely dispersed, but is
imperfectly aggregated in society. Hayek (1945) emphasized that this informa-
tion cannot be centralized by the government. Society must rely on decentralized
mechanisms to use information. This does not suggest that decentralizing the
use of information best serves society. Keynes (1936) argued that financial mar-
kets are excessively volatile because professional investors are more concerned
with forecasting the forecasts of others than forecasting the fundamental value
of the assets that they trade. This has become known as Keynes’ beauty contest
metaphor for financial markets.1
More recently, Morris & Shin (2002) (MS) developed a theoretical model of in-
formation and coordination among agents to formalize the coordinating role of
public information and to examine its implications for welfare. Their analysis is
nested in a beauty-contest game in which agents’ utility positively depends on
correctly forecasting the true (realized) future state of the economy on the one
hand and, on the other hand, forecasting as close to the other agents as possible
(Keynes’s Beauty Contest). Players have two information sources, one is private
(an independent signal realization for each player), while the other is public (a
common signal realization). Deviations of agents’ actions from fundamental val-
ues determine social welfare, which, in turn, results from three parameters that
reflect the precision of public and private information as well as the motivation
for coordinating their actions. As in most beauty-contest models, the informa-
tion is exogenous.2
In this game, public information has a disproportionate effect on equilibrium
outcomes relative to what is warranted on the basis of agents’ information set
for fundamentals alone. This is because agents use public information to pre-
dict fundamentals as well as to coordinate their actions. The key implication of
the model is that when individual agents have access to heterogeneous private
information, more precise public information may be damaging to welfare.
1 The “beauty contest” terminology is drawn from a passage from Keynes’ General Theory.
Keynes describes newspaper-based competitions in which entrants chose the prettiest faces
from a set of photographs, where it was optimal to nominate the most popular faces (Keynes
1936, ch. 12, p. 156).
2 See, for example, Myatt & Wallace (2011) for a model that considers endogenous information
acquisition.
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Applied to financial markets, when market participants overreact to noisy pub-
lic news because they help forecast each another’s actions, public information
can play a role that is similar to a sunspot, which may contribute to increased
volatility and decreased welfare.3 This possibility has been widely interpreted
as an objection to more transparency in central banks.4
Considerable debate has been prompted by the theoretical MS analysis, for
which there is no agreement. An empirical analysis may assist in clarifying
views. To the best of our knowledge, there has been no attempt to empirically
test the MS model. The empirical problem that must be solved is determining
the three exogenous parameters. This paper addresses this issue.
Given the controversial theoretical debate that is related to the MS model, we
perform a series of tests and contrast the results with those from a non-beauty
contest model in which agents do not second-guess other agents’ actions. From
several potentially testable models with this feature, we selected the model that
was proposed by Veldkamp (2011). The implications of the two models are
listed below. In the MS model, higher precision in private information always
increases welfare, while there is an ambiguous effect for higher precision in pub-
lic information. By contrast, in the Veldkamp (2011) model, higher precision in
public information always increases welfare, while higher precision in private
information can decrease welfare.
Our tests are performed on a large data set of professional forecasts of short-term
interest rates and long-term yields that was provided by Consensus Economics and
includes a sizable set of countries over an extended period of time. We used sur-
vey forecasts for two reasons. First, these forecasts can be interpreted as agents’
actions. Second, forecasts are important for policymakers and a broad public
audience. This is demonstrated by the active monitoring of forecasters’ accuracy
by market participants, the popular press, and researchers.5
3 See Angeletos et al. (2016). Elements of this “beauty-contest” characteristic of financial markets
have been formalized, for example, in Bacchetta & van Wincoop (2006), Allen et al. (2006), and
Angeletos et al. (2007).
4 Following MS, beauty-contest models have received close attention in other situations, such
as investment games (Angeletos & Pavan (2004)), monopolistic competition (Hellwig (2005)),
financial markets (Allen et al. (2006)), and additional economic questions (Angeletos & Pavan
(2007)). See Myatt & Wallace (2011) for more references.
5 See Marinovic et al. (2013).
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The results that emerge from our analysis are threefold. First, in most coun-
tries reported interest rate forecasts are unbiased. This is consistent with both
models. For reported yield forecasts, most countries diverge from both mod-
els. Second, for reported interest rate forecasts on a 3-month horizon, welfare
increases with more precise public information in half of the countries also in
the MS model. For these countries, the MS’s intriguing theoretical conclusion
does not apply. Third, forward guidance tends to be characterized by public
information that is less precise than private information. In the Veldkamp (2011)
model, this constellation implies that higher precision in private information al-
ways increases social welfare. Thus, when there is forward guidance, higher
precision in private information always increases welfare regardless of the un-
derlying model. By contrast, we cannot draw any conclusion about the relative
precision of signals associated with the publication of central banks’ internal in-
terest rate forecasts.
The rest of the paper is organized in the following manner. In Section 2, we
provide a brief overview of the related literature. In Section 3, we outline the
two models, our method for identifying the errors in public and private infor-
mation, and derive five hypotheses. Section 4 describes the data set that was
used to estimate the model parameters. In Section 5, we embed our procedure
in the strategic forecasting literature. In Section 6 we delineate our estimation
methodology and present the results. Section 7 discusses two empirical proper-
ties of public and private information, which is followed by several conclusions
in Section 8.
2 Literature review
The primary result of MS is that under certain parameter values, more precise
public information reduces welfare. This key finding is related to the possibility
that, when individual agents have access to heterogeneous private information,
the availability of more precise public information could damage welfare. Subse-
quent research has raised questions about the validity of applying MS’s lessons
to a macroeconomic context for two reasons.
First, the practical relevance of their primary finding has been questioned by
Svensson (2006), who argues that two strong conditions on the parameters must
be satisfied for the MS finding to apply: (i) the incentive for agents to coor-
6
dinate their actions – the coordination motive – must assume certain values;
and (ii) the public-to-private signal ratio – defined as the precision of the pub-
lic compared to the private signal – must be very low. According to Svensson
(2006), these conditions are empirically implausible, which challenges the con-
clusions of MS. Svensson (2006) contends that for reasonable parameter values,
the MS framework even implies that more precise public information increases
social welfare. In their response, Morris et al. (2006) acknowledge the validity
of Svensson’s argument. Second, in subsequent research, Hellwig (2005), Roca
(2010), and Lorenzoni (2010) examined the implications of MS’s findings using
neo-Keynesian frameworks and found that better public information is unam-
biguously beneficial.
However, other studies have identified situations in which welfare may decrease
with the provision of public information, which supports MS. For example, An-
geletos & Pavan (2007) show that the results are sensitive to the specific type
of externality that is assumed in the payoff structure. Indeed, there are condi-
tions under which public information releases decrease welfare. As such, the
phenomenon that MS have identified, while not general, may be an important
feature for specific economic contexts.
While the models that are used in the literature are usually static and abstract
from learning, Amador & Weill (2012) analyze an alternative mechanism based
on a dynamic information externality. There are no payoff externalities, but
public information slows the diffusion of private information in the popula-
tion. Agents learn from the actions of others through two channels, public and
private. When agents only learn from the public channel, a release of public
information increases agents’ total knowledge at all times and increases welfare.
However, when there is a private learning channel, this finding is reversed.
Amador & Weill (2010) study the effect of releasing public information about
productivity or monetary shocks using a micro-founded macroeconomic model
in which agents learn from the distribution of nominal prices. Their results are
not driven by any form of payoff externality. Rather, their results are generated
from an information externality that makes public information releases welfare
reducing by increasing agents’ uncertainty about fundamentals.
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Angeletos & Pavan (2009) examine the possible contribution of Pigovian-type
corrective taxes for inducing a socially optimal private sector response to het-
erogeneous information. Using a direct adaptation of MS, they demonstrate that
more precise information can reduce welfare in general. However, policies that
restore efficiency for the decentralized use of information guarantee a positive
social value for any information that is disseminated by policymakers. This
can be achieved with an appropriate tax structure which, by influencing private
sector agents’ incentives to react to information, guarantees that welfare will
increase with more information. This is true regardless of whether the initial
inefficiency originated in payoff interactions, such as in MS and Angeletos &
Pavan (2007), or informational externalities, such as in Amador & Weill (2010,
2012).
James & Lawler (2011) extend the MS analysis to examine the relationship be-
tween the quality of public information and social welfare in the presence of
stabilization policies in central banks. This modification has significant impli-
cations for the desirability of central bank disclosure in an economy that has
heterogeneous private information. When policy is conducted according to an
optimally designed rule, more precision in the informational content of the pol-
icymaker’s announcements is detrimental to welfare.
3 Two models
This section presents two of the four types of models that are discussed in the
literature. According to Angeletos & Pavan (2007), economies can be classified
into four types. In type (1), higher precision in both public and private informa-
tion always increases welfare. In type (2), higher precision in public information
can decrease welfare. In type (3), higher precision in private information can
decrease welfare. In type (4), higher precision in both public and private in-
formation can decrease welfare. We limit the analysis in this paper to type (2)
and (3) models. As an example of a type (2) economy, we examine the MS
beauty-contest model. As an example of a type (3) economy, we use the non-
beauty contest model that was proposed by Veldkamp (2011).6 In both models
the agents’ utility functions differ from their social welfare functions.
6 Models can be classified along other dimensions. One distinguishes between strategic comple-
mentarities (the MS model), strategic substitutability and no strategic interaction (the Veldkamp
(2011) model). Another dimension distinguishes between positive and negative externalities for
mean action and dispersion on the one hand and no externalities on the other.
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In the MS model, agents have an incentive to make as good a forecast as possible
and to be close to the other forecasters’ actions. However, welfare only depends
on how close actions are to the fundamental values of the economy.7 In the
Veldkamp (2011) model, the opposite is true. Forecasters only have an incentive
for making an accurate forecast, while welfare depends on both the quality of
forecasts and their alignment with each other.
The basic framework of the models is provided by two pieces of information –
a public and a private signal – which agents receive and incorporate into an ac-
tion, for example, they may report a forecast for interest rates. While the private
signal is only individually observed and differs for each agent, the public signal
is the same for all. Higher precision in both public and private information is
defined as a lower variance in the signals’ errors.
Determining the parameters in both models is not unambiguously possible in
our data set. While we cannot directly measure the signals, our method allows
us to separate the errors that are contained in both signals. We derive five hy-
potheses that implicitly or explicitly arise from the two models, and test these
hypotheses using the interest rate and yield forecasts of professional forecast-
ers. We define the public signal as all information that is publicly available –
everything that is simultaneously observable by all agents that could indicate
the future state of short-term interest rates or yields on long-term bonds.
3.1 Socially costly public information: The model of Morris &
Shin (2002)
This section formally recaps the MS model, which serves as an example for a
type (2) beauty-contest economy. We derive three hypotheses from this model,
which we will empirically test in Section 6. We begin with the agents’ utility
function (Subsection 3.1.1), followed by their optimal actions (Subsection 3.1.2).
7 The crucial factor underlying MS’s original finding is the presence of a strategic complemen-
tarity. However, Angeletos & Pavan (2007) show that a strategic complementarity, per se, is
neither necessary nor sufficient for implying that there is excessive weight (relative to the ef-
ficient benchmark) on public information for determining individual actions. Rather, what is
crucial is what Angeletos & Pavan (2007) refer to as the “equilibrium degree of coordination”
relative to the “socially optimal degree of coordination” (for a formal definition, see Appendix
A.1). In MS, the beauty-contest term in individual payoff functions leads the former to exceed
the latter, which increases the possibility that more precision in public information could be
damaging.
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We then describe our method for identifying the two errors that are contained in
public and private information (Subsection 3.1.3). Subsequently, we derive what
we define as the variance ratio (Subsection 3.1.4) and connect it to the model’s
welfare properties (Subsection 3.1.5).
An individual action – a reported forecast in our setting – is not only affected
by the (expected) interest rate path that is indicated by the observed signals but
also by how the other agents act (what forecasts the other agents are expected
to report). This leads to a coordination motive through which agents coordinate
and second-guess their peers’ actions.8 By contrast, the social planner seeks to
keep agents’ actions as close to the future fundamental values of the economy
as possible.
We develop three hypotheses from this model. Hypothesis 1 is that the reported
forecasts are unbiased. Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 build on Svensson’s
(2006) critique. The second hypothesis implies that higher precision in public
signals increases social welfare. The third hypothesis postulates that the public
signal is less precise than the private signal.
3.1.1 Agents’ utility function and social welfare
The utility of agent i is given by
ui (ai, a¯, σa, θ) = − (1− r) · (ai − θ)2 − r · (ai − a¯)2 + r · σ2a (1)
where ai is agent i’s action and θ is the realized (future) state of the economy.
We interpret an agent’s action as a reported forecast of interest rates or yields.
MS assume that θ is drawn from an (improper) uniform prior over the real line.9
r is the parameter of the coordination motive, with 0 < r < 1. The closer r is to
1, the more utility an agent derives from being close to the other agents’ forecast.
The first part of Equation (1) reflects the “fundamental” component of the utility
function. (ai − θ)2 is the (squared) deviation of agent i’s action from the realized
future state times the weight that is from the coordination motive (1− r). We
call the deviation (ai − θ) action error. The second component of the utility func-
8 Agents’ actions are a linear function of the signals. This guarantees a unique equilibrium.
9 Note that an improper prior implies an infinite variance for the state variable, which is implau-
sible. However, this does not affect the MS’s theoretical results, as their model also holds for
proper priors. See Veldkamp (2011) and Appendix A.2.5.
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tion reflects Keynes’s Beauty Contest, where second-guessing the other agents’
actions pays off. The closer an agent to the average action (a¯), the better off he
is.10 However, for society, this is a zero sum game because, unlike agents, the so-
cial planner only cares about social welfare and seeks to keep all agents’ actions
close to the true (future) state of the economy.11 The social welfare function in
the discrete case for i = {1, ..., N} agents is defined as12
W (a¯, σa, θ) =
1
1− r ·
1
N
N
∑
i=1
ui (ai, a¯, σa, θ) = − 1N
N
∑
i=1
(ai − θ)2 (2)
This utility and the implied welfare function satisfy the conditions for a beauty
contest. We formally demonstrate this in Appendix A.1.1.
3.1.2 Agents’ optimal action
To develop additional testable hypotheses, we begin with the optimal action (a
reported forecast in our setting) that is taken by agent i, which MS established
as
ai =
α
α + β(1− r) · y +
β(1− r)
α + β(1− r) · xi (3)
where y is the public signal that is observed by all agents, while xi reflects the
private signal that is observed by agent i. The unique optimal action (ai) in
equilibrium is a weighted average of the two signals (xi and y). The weights are
determined by the precision in the public and private signal (α and β) as well as
the coordination motive (r). MS assume
y = θ + η η ∼ iidN (0, 1/α)
xi = θ + εi εi ∼ iidN (0, 1/β)
η is the error in the public signal. While the private signal contains an individual
error εi, the precision of the private signal (β) is the same for all agents. MS
assume that η and εi are independent of each other and independent of the
future state of the economy θ. Consistent with MS, we assume that α, β and r
are constant and identical for all agents.
10 Note that ∂ui (ai , a¯, σa, θ) /(∂ai∂a¯) > 0 implies strategic complementarity, while
∂ui (ai , a¯, σa, θ) /∂a¯ > 0 and ∂ui (ai , a¯, σa, θ) /∂σa > 0 are positive externalities for the mean
and the dispersion of actions. For an extensive discussion of utility functions, see Angeletos
& Pavan (2007).
11 Note that σ2a is the variance for all agents’ actions.
12 Note that while MS use a continuum of agents, our data set has a discrete number of agents.
MS normalize social welfare with 1/(1− r).
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3.1.3 Method to identify the errors in the two signals
For the empirical analysis, we must identify the errors that are in the two signals.
To this end, we plug y and xi into Equation (3). After rearranging, we obtain13
ai − θ = αα + β(1− r) · η +
β(1− r)
α + β(1− r) · εi (4)
The left-hand side of Equation (4) is the action error for agent i. The right-hand
side of the equation contains the action error as a weighted average of the errors
in the two signals.
The ex-post cross-sectional mean action error (a¯− θ)|η, ε1, ε2, ..., εN is given by
a¯− θ = α
α + β(1− r) · η (5)
as εi ∼ iidN(0, 1/β). Because η is (ex-post) the same for all agents at a cer-
tain point in time, we conclude that the ex-post cross-sectional mean action error
comes from the error that is contained in the public signal (η), the weight that is
assigned to the precision of both signals (α and β), and the coordination motive
r. We will use this finding to identify the errors that are contained in the signals.
The expected action error of agent i and the expected cross-sectional mean action
error are unbiased because η ∼ iidN(0, 1/α) and εi ∼ iidN(0, 1/β), that is
E [ai − θ] = 0 (6)
E [a¯− θ] = 0 (7)
This leads to our first hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1 The mean forecast error for the reported forecasts is unbiased over time.
Rejection of Hypothesis 1 implies rejection of the MS model. We will test this
hypothesis in Subsection 6.1.
3.1.4 Variance ratio
To derive Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3, we must calculate what we call the
variance ratio, V. We define this as the ratio of the variance of the ex-post cross-
13 All equations are derived in Appendix A.2.
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sectional mean action error (V1) to the variance of agents’ deviation from the
cross-sectional mean action (V2). V1 is
V1 =
α
(α + β(1− r))2 (8)
To derive V2, we calculate the errors in the private signal using Equation (4) and
Equation (5), which yields
ai − a¯ = β(1− r)α + β(1− r) · εi (9)
The variance of the agents’ deviation from the cross-sectional mean action fol-
lows as
V2 =
β(1− r)2
(α + β(1− r))2 (10)
Hence, the variance ratio is given as
V =
V1
V2
=
V
[
(a¯− θ)
]
V
[
(ai − a¯)
] = α/β
(1− r)2 (11)
The equation shows the relationship between the variance ratio V and the public-
to-private signal ratio α/β as well as the coordination motive r. V is large when
the public signal is more precise than the private signal, or when the coordina-
tion motive r is large (r close to 1), ceteris paribus. Alternatively, Equation (11)
can be written as
α/β = V · (1− r)2 (12)
which establishes the functional relationship between the public-to-private sig-
nal ratio and the coordination motive for a given variance ratio.
3.1.5 Social welfare
Next, we present the expected social welfare and the conditions that Svens-
son (2006) postulated for more precision in public signals having an increas-
ing/decreasing effect on welfare. These conditions lead to Hypothesis 2 and
13
Hypothesis 3. Expected social welfare according to MS is written as
E [W (a¯, σa, θ) |θ] = − α
(α + β(1− r))2 −
β(1− r)
(α + β(1− r))2 (13)
MS indicate that welfare always increases with higher precision in private signals
(∂E [W (a¯, σa, θ) |θ] /∂β > 0). However, the first derivative with respect to the
precision of public signals is
∂E [W (a¯, σa, θ) |θ]
∂α
=
α− (2r− 1)(1− r)β
(α + β(1− r))3 (14)
This implies that higher precision in public signals (tantamount to an increase
in α) increases welfare iff
α
β
≥ (2r− 1)(1− r)
Svensson (2006) establishes the following conditions:
• If r < 0.5, welfare is increasing with the precision of public signals.
• If 0.5 < r < 0.75 and α/β < (2r− 1)(1− r), welfare is decreasing with the
precision of public signals.
• If 0.5 < r < 0.75 and α/β ≥ (2r− 1)(1− r), welfare is increasing with the
precision of public signals.
• If 0.75 < r, welfare is increasing with the precision of public signals.14
We incorporate Equation (12) into Svensson’s conditions, which yields
V S (2r− 1)/(1− r) (15)
To derive Hypothesis 2, we insert the two critical boundary values for r (0.5 and
0.75) into Equation (15) and obtain for r = 0.5 the lower bound (2r− 1)/(1− r) = 0
and for r = 0.75 the upper bound (2r − 1)/(1− r) = 2. When the variance ratio
V is between the lower and the upper bound (0, 2), a higher precision of pub-
lic signals could decrease welfare. According to Svensson (2006), economies are
rarely in a state in which social welfare is decreasing with the precision of public
signals. This leads us to Hypothesis 2.
14 Figure 4 in Appendix E illustrates the conditions that were postulated by Svensson (2006).
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Hypothesis 2 Higher precision in public signals increases welfare if 2 < V.
Hypothesis 2 will be tested in Subsection 6.2. Note that Hypothesis 2 is a suf-
ficient, but not necessary, condition for the higher precision of public signals to
increase welfare. By contrast, when 2 > V, we cannot assess the effect of higher
precision of public signals on welfare as it depends on r, which we cannot esti-
mate with our data.
Next, we derive Hypothesis 3. This includes a condition for the public-to-private
signal ratio α/β. There are three cases to distinguish.
Case 1 α/β > 1: The public signal is more precise than the private signal.
Case 2 α/β < 1: The public signal is less precise than the private signal.
Case 3 α/β = 1: Both signals are equally precise.
From Equation (12), we can infer that α/β decreases in r. The maximum value
that α/β can assume is when r equals 0, which yields α/β = V. Hypothesis 3
summarizes.
Hypothesis 3 If V < 1, the public signal is less precise than the private signal, regard-
less of the coordination motive r.
We will test Hypothesis 3 in Subsection 6.3. Note, Hypothesis 3 is a sufficient,
but not necessary, condition for the public signal to be less precise than the pri-
vate signal. In other words, if V > 1, we cannot conclude that the public signal
is more precise than the private signal.
As shown in Appendix A.2.5, our results for the variance ratio V exhibit the
same interpretation irrespective of whether we assume proper or improper pri-
ors.
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Figure 1: Graphical illustration of Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3
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Critical region
This figure plots the function α/β = V · (1 − r)2. The dashed black lines show the null for
Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3. The shaded blue area illustrates the region in which higher
precision in public signals lowers social welfare. This region is defined by Svensson (2006) as
f (r) ≡ (2r − 1)(1− r) with 0.5 < r < 0.75. If α/β < f (r) and 0.5 < r < 0.75, higher precision
in public signals decreases social welfare. If a function does not cross the shaded blue area, we
accept Hypothesis 2: Higher precision in public signals increases social welfare. If the maximum
value of a function is less than one, we accept Hypothesis 3: The public signal is less precise
than the private signal, regardless of the coordination motive r.
Figure 1 provides a graphic illustration of Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 in
the (r, α/β)-space. If the function α/β = V · (1 − r)2 (Equation (12)) does not
cross the blue area, we accept Hypothesis 2 – higher precision in public signals
increases social welfare. If the maximum value of the function is less than one,
we accept Hypothesis 3 – the public signal is less precise than the private signal.
As shown in the figure, the yellow curve, for example, never crosses the blue
area. This implies that for V = 5, we accept Hypothesis 2. Because the yellow
curve’s maximum value is greater than 1, we reject Hypothesis 3. By contrast, if
V = 0.5 (the light blue curve), we reject Hypothesis 2 and accept Hypothesis 3.
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3.2 Socially costly private information: A model by Veldkamp
(2011)
This sections presents a model of Veldkamp (2011) as an example of a type (3)
non-beauty contest economy. We ask whether socially costly private information
(private signals) is possible. As Veldkamp (2011) documents, if there is a positive
rather than negative coordination externality, then more precise private signals
might decrease social welfare.15 We recap the model and derive two hypotheses
that are based on this model. In Subsection 3.2.1, we show the utility function
and its corresponding welfare function. Subsection 3.2.2 derives the agents’
optimal action. Subsection 3.2.3 identifies the parameters. Subsection 3.2.4 pro-
vides the model’s variance ratio, while Subsection 3.2.5 discusses the welfare
implications for specific parameter values. We will test the two hypotheses from
this model in Section 6.
The basic framework of this model is similar to MS. In contrast to MS, this model
assumes that agents only have an incentive for reporting the accurate forecast
based on their observed signals and not to coordinate with each other. However,
social welfare is not only affected by the accuracy of the reported forecasts but
also by their dispersion. However, agents do not coordinate, even though this
would decrease dispersion and hence increase social welfare.
We develop two hypotheses from this model. Hypothesis 4 is that the reported
forecasts are unbiased. Hypothesis 5 states that higher precision in private sig-
nals increases welfare.
3.2.1 Agents’ utility function and social welfare
Veldkamp (2011) proposes the following utility function
ui (ai, a¯, σa, θ) = − (1− r) · (ai − θ)2 − r · σ2a (16)
with 0 < r < 1.16 The notation is the same as before. ai is agent i’s action, θ is
15 See Veldkamp (2011), p. 51 ff.
16 Note that ∂ui (ai , a¯, σa, θ) /(∂ai∂a¯) = 0 implies no strategic interactions (neither complementar-
ity nor substitutability), while ∂ui (ai , a¯, σa, θ) /∂a¯ = 0 reflects no externality for the mean action
and ∂ui (ai , a¯, σa, θ) /∂σa < 0 is a negative externality for the dispersion of actions (the higher
the dispersion, the lower utility). This is equivalent to a positive coordination externality (the
lower the dispersion, the higher utility). For an extensive discussion of utility functions, see
Angeletos & Pavan (2007).
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the (realized) future state17 and σ2a is the variance of agents’ actions. The model
by Veldkamp (2011) is a good model to contrast with MS since Equation (16) is
nested in Equation (1).
The utility function presented in Equation (16) implies that each agent only has
an incentive for making his action as close as possible to the unknown state θ.
Additionally, an agent benefits when all agents’ actions are more coordinated (σ2a
small), which leads to a positive coordination externality. There are i = {1, ..., N}
agents in the economy. Therefore, from an individual agent’s perspective, σ2a is
given if N is large. The welfare function in the discrete case is written as18
W (a¯, σa, θ) =
1
N
N
∑
i=1
ui (ai, a¯, σa, θ) = −(1− r) · 1N
N
∑
i=1
(ai − θ)2 − r · σ2a (17)
In contrast to MS, welfare increases when agents actions’ are close to each other
(σa small). This utility and welfare function do not satisfy the conditions for a
beauty contest. We formally show this in Appendix A.1.2.
3.2.2 Agents’ optimal action
According to Veldkamp (2011), agent’s optimal action (a reported forecast in our
setting) equals
ai =
α
α + β
· y + β
α + β
· xi (18)
The unique optimal action (ai) in equilibrium is a weighted average of the two
signals (xi and y). The weights are determined by the precision in the public
and the private signal (α and β). Note that coordination r has no role in agents’
optimal action because their only incentive is making a precise forecast, as σa is
given from the perspective of an individual forecaster.19 The structure of both
signals (y and xi) is the same as in MS, see Subsection 3.1.2.
3.2.3 Method for identifying the errors in the two signals
For the empirical analysis, we need to identify the errors in the two signals.
To this end, we incorporate y and xi into Equation (18). After rearranging, we
17 Similar to MS, Veldkamp (2011) assumes that θ is drawn from an (improper) uniform prior
over the real line.
18 Note that while Veldkamp (2011) uses a continuum of agents, our data set has a discrete
number of agents.
19 In contrast to MS, in this model the optimal action corresponds to the most accurate forecast
based on agents’ exogenous signals.
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obtain20
ai − θ = αα + β · η +
β
α + β
· εi (19)
The left-hand side of Equation (19) is the action error for agent i. The right-hand
side of the equation presents the action error as a weighted average of the error
in the two signals. We assume, consistent with Veldkamp (2011), that α and β
are constant and identical for all agents.
The ex-post cross-sectional mean action error (a¯− θ)|η, ε1, ε2, ..., εN is given by
a¯− θ = α
α + β
· η (20)
because εi ∼ iidN(0, 1/β). As the error contained in the public signal η is (ex
post) the same for all agents at a specific point in time, the ex-post cross-sectional
mean action error results from η and some weight that is provided by the preci-
sion of both signals (α and β).
However, the expected action error for agent i and the expected cross-sectional
mean action error are unbiased because η ∼ iidN(0, 1/α) and εi ∼ iidN(0, 1/β),
that is
E [ai − θ] = 0 (21)
E [a¯− θ] = 0 (22)
This leads to Hypothesis 4.
Hypothesis 4 The mean forecast error for the reported forecasts is unbiased over time.
Hence, if we reject Hypothesis 4, we reject the model by Veldkamp (2011). Note
that while Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 4 are mathematically the same, they
refer to different model frameworks.
3.2.4 Variance ratio
To derive Hypothesis 5 we must again calculate the variance ratio V = V1/V2.
V1 is the variance for the cross-sectional mean action error, V2 the variance of the
20 All equations are derived in Appendix A.3.
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deviation of agents’ actions to the cross-sectional mean action. To calculate V1,
we calculate the variance of Equation (20). V1 is written as
V1 =
α
(α + β)2
(23)
Note that the theoretical identities change compared to MS. To derive V2, we
calculate the errors in the private signal using Equation (19) and Equation (20),
which yields
ai − a¯ = βα + β · εi (24)
Hence, the variance of agents’ deviation from the mean action is provided by
V2 =
β
(α + β)2
(25)
The inverse variance ratio follows as
1/V =
V2
V1
=
V
[
(ai − a¯)
]
V
[
(a¯− θ)
] = β/α (26)
Note that we use the inverse 1/V. This is purely for the ease of exposition. In
contrast to MS, r has no role in the variance ratio. However, r is crucial for social
welfare.
3.2.5 Social welfare
Next, we present social welfare and its properties with respect to information
precision to derive Hypothesis 5. According to Veldkamp (2011), the expected
social welfare corresponds with
E [W (a¯, σa, θ) |θ] = −(1− r) · 1
α + β
− r · β
(α + β)2
(27)
A more precise public signal always increases welfare (∂E[W (a¯, σa, θ) |θ]/∂α >
0). However, the effect of a more precise private signal is ambiguous. The
derivative with respect to β is
∂E [W (a¯, σa, θ) |θ]
∂β
=
β− α(2r− 1)
(α + β)3
(28)
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Figure 2: Graphical illustration of Hypothesis 5
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This figure plots the function β/α = (2r− 1) (blue line). The dashed black line shows the null for
Hypothesis 5. If β/α < (2r− 1) with 0.5 < r < 1 (shaded blue area), higher precision in private
signals decreases social welfare. The maximum value of (2r− 1) in the space 0 < r < 1 is r = 1.
Thus, if β/α > 1, higher precision in private signals always increases social welfare irrespective
of the value of r.
Higher precision of private signals decreases welfare iff
β/α < (2r− 1)
If β/α is smaller than (2r− 1), welfare decreases with more precise private signals
(β). If β/α is larger than (2r− 1), welfare increases with the precision of private
signals. Furthermore, 0 < r < 1. Hence, the maximum value of (2r− 1) equals 1.
Figure 2 illustrates this effect. The blue line corresponds to β/α = (2r− 1). If a
point in the (r, β/α)-space is below the blue line (in the shaded blue area), higher
precision in private signals decreases welfare. By contrast, if this point is above
the blue line, higher precision in private signals increases welfare.
Next, we combine this finding with the results for 1/V. If 1/V = β/α is larger
than 1 (or V < 1), more precise private signals increase welfare regardless of
the value of r. In other words, if private signals are more precise than public
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signals, making private signals even more precise has a socially beneficial effect.
However, if 1/V is smaller than 1 (V > 1), we would need a value for r to make
a statement about welfare. Because we cannot estimate r, we cannot establish
whether more precise private signals increase or decrease social welfare. This
leads to our final hypothesis.
Hypothesis 5 Higher precision in private signals is socially beneficial if V < 1.
Note, Hypothesis 5 is a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for more precise
private signals to increase welfare. In other words, if V > 1, we cannot conclude
that more precise private signals decrease social welfare.
Furthermore, it is important to note that mathematically Hypothesis 3 and Hy-
pothesis 5 are the same. However, while Hypothesis 5 (if accepted) has a clear-
cut conclusion for social welfare, Hypothesis 3 only makes a statement about
the relative precision in the signals.
4 Data
After developing the testable implications in the models, we describe the data
that are used to test our five hypotheses. We used monthly forecasts of short-
term interest rates that were available for 34 countries (primarily for maturity in
three months) and forecasts of the yields on ten-year government bonds for 23
countries, which were provided by Consensus Economics. The forecasts are made
by professionals, such as financial institutions and other forecasting agencies,
beginning at the earliest in October 1989 and ending in June 2017. Two forecast
horizons are surveyed – 3 and 12 months. We interpret these reported forecasts
as actions.
As inferred from Table 1, the data set contains approximately 106,000 obser-
vations for short-term interest rate forecasts with a forecast horizon of three
months, and 101,000 with a forecast horizon of twelve months. For yields, there
are 69,000 and 66,000 observations, which reflect a total of 343,000 individual
forecasts.21
21 Table 7 and Table 8 in Appendix B provide details for these data.
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Table 1: Consensus Economics individual observations
Individual short-term interest rate forecasts (for 34 countries)
for 3 month forecast horizon 106,428
for 12 month forecast horizon 100,967
Individual long-term government bond yield forecasts (for 23 countries)
for 3 month forecast horizon 69,497
for 12 month forecast horizon 66,221
Total 343,113
To calculate the forecast errors, we employ the realized end-of-month interest
rates and government bond yields from Thompson Reuters’ Datastream.22 Sev-
eral amendments in the forecast variables were made by Consensus Economics
over time, for example, when an interest rate loses economic relevance. Table 9
and Table 10 in Appendix B list these changes, the time span and the Data-
stream tickers in detail. Note that our data represent business forecasts, which are
not scientific in the sense of Mincer & Zarnowitz (1969), but represent a sample
of the prevailing climate of opinions, which allows us to test the formation of
opinions in the models.
There are two advantages of using data for interest rates and yields. First, unlike,
for example, GDP data, they are not subject to revisions. Second, specifically
short-term interest rates are directly controlled by the central bank. More pre-
cise public information on short-term rate forecasts can be interpreted as higher
(central bank) transparency, consistent with Svensson (2006).
Figure 3: Scheme of forecasts with horizon of 3 months from October 2014 to
May 2015
30 Sep 31 Oct 30 Nov 31 Dec 31 Jan 28 Feb 31 Mar 30 Apr 31 May
10 Nov
8 Dec
12 Jan
9 Feb
13 Oct
22 There is one exception. We used the PHIBOR – the short-term interest rate for Philippines –
from Bloomberg.
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Figure 3 illustrates the forecast scheme for the 3-month horizon. For example,
on October 13, 2014, an agent predicted the interest rate for January 31, 2015.
Importantly, the forecast error that was made on October 13, 2014 correlates
with the forecast errors for November 10, 2014, December 8, 2014 and January
12, 2015.23 On February 9, 2015, the forecaster can observe the forecast error
from October 13, 2014, and accordingly adjusts the upcoming forecast for the
end of May.
5 Relationship with strategic forecasting literature
Before testing our hypotheses, we relate our empirical procedure to the literature
on strategic forecasts. In our context, it is important to differentiate between two
possible ways that agents may act when producing their forecasts. According
to Marinovic et al. (2013), forecasters are agents who make strategic choices. To
interpret the content of their forecasts, it is essential to understand the role of
incentives for forecasters. On the one hand, they may want to be perceived as
well-informed and may be reluctant to release information that could be inaccu-
rate. These forecasters will shade their forecasts toward the established consen-
sus to avoid unfavorable publicity when they are wrong. This is referred to as
reputational cheap talk in the literature.
On the other hand, only the most accurate forecaster obtains a disproportionate
fraction of public attention, which implies that the payoff for being the best is
significantly higher than the second best. Thus, forecasters might exaggerate
their true predictions, conditional on getting it right, to stand out from com-
peting forecasters. By exaggerating their private information, these forecasters
reduce the probability of winning, but increase their visibility, which is condi-
tional on winning. This behavior is called forecasting contest.24
While the MS model has a different micro-foundation than the reputational cheap
talk game, the optimal action in the MS model corresponds to a strategy that is
consistent with a reputational cheap talk game. Both are characterized by an ex-
cessive weight that is given to public information.25 By contrast, the Veldkamp
(2011) model cannot be assigned to either of these two forecasting strategies,
23 We accounted for this correlation in the empirical analysis in Section 6.
24 See also Ottaviani & Sørensen (2006a,b).
25 We leave the mathematical connection between these two models to future research.
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because the optimal behavior is to report the “honest forecast”.26
In the literature, it is common to describe a world in which public information
is given excessive weight as herding. By contrast, a world in which private in-
formation is excessively weighed is commonly referred to as anti-herding. Thus,
while the MS exhibits herding, Veldkamp (2011) features neither herding nor anti-
herding.
While reputation induces forecasters to partially disregard their private infor-
mation and excessively agree with each other (herding), competition leads to
the opposite – an exaggeration of private information and excessive disagree-
ment (anti-herding). Marinovic et al. (2013) developed a framework to analyze
the statistical properties of strategic forecasts that result from combining the
reputational and the contest objectives. Using data from the Business Week In-
vestment Outlook’s reported yearly GNP growth forecasts for the period between
1972 and 2004, they report that forecasters were primarily driven by compet-
itive incentives (anti-herding). Their test assumes a constant prior as the only
public information, which makes no sense in our setup. However, other papers
demonstrate mixed results. Chen & Jiang (2006) and Bernhardt et al. (2006) find
evidence of anti-herding in the context of financial analysts. By contrast, in the
context of recommendations, Jegadeesh & Kim (2010) found that recommenda-
tions that are further away from the consensus induce stronger market reactions,
which is consistent with herding.27
Given the mixed evidence in empirical research, any assumption about how the
forecasting market weights public and private information appears to be valid.
Against this foundation, we test the MS and the Veldkamp (2011) models as
two examples of different weighting mechanisms with survey data on financial
variables.
26 An “honest forecast” refers to a reported forecast that is formed without strategic interaction
(neither overweighing nor underweighing the information). See Ottaviani & Sørensen (2006b).
27 We applied the test by Bernhardt et al. (2006) on our data and found that, specifically for
interest rates, there appears to be herding behavior. These results are available upon request.
Note that this test does not fit into the MS model one-for-one, because this test needs a fixed
reference point. The reference point is the reported 12-month forecast. For the tests of the two
models in this paper, forecast horizons must be separated from each other.
As shown by Marinovic et al. (2013), when forecasters sufficiently underweight their private
information relative to common public information (for example, due to the beauty contests
concerns a` la Morris & Shin (2002)), an increase in the number of forecasters can lead to a
reduction in the informativeness of the consensus forecast. We also tested this with our data.
The results, which are available upon request, were mixed.
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6 Tests of hypotheses
In this section, we test our hypotheses. The section is organized into four subsec-
tions. In Subsection 6.1 to Subsection 6.3, we test Hypothesis 1 to Hypothesis 5.
In Subsection 6.4, we investigate whether forward guidance or the publication
of central banks’ internal interest rate forecasts changed the relative precision of
public and private information that was received by forecasters. Appendix D
describes our methodology.28
In Section 3, we presented two theoretical models with different payoff and wel-
fare structures. In MS, agents gain utility from correctly forecasting the future
state and from being close to other agents’ reported forecasts. Welfare only de-
pends on the accuracy of the reported forecasts. In Veldkamp (2011), agents only
obtain utility from correctly forecasting the future state. However, welfare de-
pends on both the accuracy of the reported forecasts and their dispersion. In the
context of our dataset, both payoff and welfare structures appear to be valid.29
Both models assume that both signals are exogenous. In reality, this may not
always be true. In the empirical analysis, we use the signals as given, as we do
not know how they came about. We do know that both current signals must
be correlated with their past signals, because today’s signals contain all previ-
ous signals. As such, we account for autocorrelation in our tests. Examples of
public signals include the forecasts that were reported in the previous period.
They may also reflect newspaper articles, central bank announcements, a public
debate about monetary policy, and releases of GDP and inflation data, which, in
turn, may shape monetary policy decisions.
In addition, the two models assume that the realized state of the economy θ –
in our context, realized interest rates and yields – is also exogenous. This is
a valid assumption in our dataset, because the reported forecasts (forecasters’
actions) minimally affect the fundamentals. This situation may be different for
households’ actions, for example.30
28 Note that the MS and Veldkamp (2011) models assume I(0) variables. However, interest rates
and yields are usually I(1). Hence, we use the reported forecasts and the realized changes
in interest rates and yields that are I(0). Because we only use forecast errors to test our
hypotheses, this constraint is automatically satisfied, as ( tai,t+h − θt)− (θt+h − θt) = tai,t+h −
θt+h, where t is the time index and h is the forecast horizon.
29 We postpone the derivation of the alternative payoff and welfare structures and tests of their
applicability to reported forecasts for future research.
30 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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6.1 Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 4
Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 4 argue that the reported forecasts are unbiased,
i.e. they do not include systematic errors. We apply the method of Fama & Mac-
Beth (1973) to estimate a regression for each country and variable, controlling
for autocorrelations, based on Petersen (2009).31 The regression equation is
tai,t+h − θt+h = b + ei,t+h (29)
t is when a forecaster forms his action (reported forecast) and h is the forecast
horizon. The null hypothesis is b = 0, and the alternative b 6= 0. If a t-test accepts
the null, we conclude that the reported forecasts are unbiased, which allows us to
accept both models on empirical grounds. Otherwise, we can reject both models.
Table 2 and Table 3 present the results for the reported forecasts of short-term
interest rates and long-term yields at the 3- and 12-month horizons, divided into
four geographic regions based on the classification of Consensus Economics. The
first panel reports the forecasts for Western countries, the second for the Asian-
Pacific area, the third for Eastern Europe, and the fourth for Latin America (only
interest rates). The tables also indicate the individual countries and the begin-
ning month for the time series. The table provides two results. b̂ reflects the
intercept of Equation (29), and σ̂b is its standard deviation. In addition, the table
contains T, which denotes the length of the time series in months and NT the
number of individual forecasts.
Table 2 provides a clear result. In most countries (28 out of 34) and across all
geographical regions, reported interest rate forecasts for the 3-month horizon
are unbiased, which supports both models. For the 12-month forecast hori-
zon, most countries’ reported interest rate forecasts are unbiased, although this
number decreases compared to the short forecast horizon. In six countries, the
reported interest rate forecasts are biased for both forecasting horizons: Canada,
the Czech Republic, Japan, the Philippines, Sweden, and the US.
Table 3 presents the results for the reported yield forecasts. In contrast to inter-
est rate forecasts, reported yield forecasts are biased, except for in Italy, India,
Indonesia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, for both forecast horizons.32
31 Appendix D provides details.
32 Robustness checks using sub-periods before and after August 2007, which we equate with the
beginning of the financial crisis, result in similar findings for most countries.
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Table 2: Interest rates’ test of Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 4
h=3 h=12
b̂ σ̂b T NT b̂ σ̂b T NT
Data set Western Consensus Forecasts
USA Oct-89 0.0023 *** 0.0006 330 7846 0.0076 *** 0.0027 321 7501
JPN Jan-90 0.0010 *** 0.0004 330 4965 0.0037 ** 0.0016 321 4580
DEU Oct-89 0.0004 0.0004 330 7892 0.0032 * 0.0018 321 7614
FRA Oct-89 -0.0003 0.0006 330 5261 0.0019 0.0019 321 5049
GBR Oct-89 0.0005 0.0006 330 7695 0.0048 *** 0.0020 321 7508
ITA Oct-89 -0.0002 0.0009 330 3282 0.0024 0.0024 321 3162
CAN Oct-89 0.0014 ** 0.0007 330 4819 0.0071 *** 0.0024 321 4676
NLD Jan-95 0.0007 0.0006 267 2331 0.0045 ** 0.0020 258 2242
NOR Jun-98 0.0007 0.0008 226 1702 0.0040 0.0034 217 1639
ESP Jan-95 0.0010 * 0.0006 267 3248 0.0058 *** 0.0023 258 3110
SWE Jan-95 0.0014 *** 0.0006 267 2900 0.0080 *** 0.0023 258 2801
CHE Jun-98 0.0009 0.0006 226 2407 0.0046 ** 0.0022 217 2286
Data set Asia Pacific Consensus Forecasts
AUS Nov-90 0.0011 0.0007 317 4849 0.0064 ** 0.0028 308 4610
CHN Jul-03 0.0003 0.0005 165 1611 0.0019 0.0016 156 1510
HKG Dec-94 0.0006 0.0009 268 2935 0.0044 0.0031 259 2810
IND Dec-94 0.0000 0.0017 268 1788 0.0031 0.0039 259 1562
IDN Dec-94 0.0025 0.0039 268 1734 0.0001 0.0106 259 1680
MYS Dec-94 0.0008 0.0007 268 2816 0.0029 0.0023 259 2700
NZL Dec-94 0.0006 0.0009 268 3203 0.0040 0.0030 259 3082
PHL Apr-09 0.0075 *** 0.0026 92 263 0.0171 *** 0.0055 83 207
SGP Dec-94 0.0010 0.0009 268 2698 0.0033 0.0022 259 2615
KOR Dec-94 0.0015 0.0021 268 2569 0.0055 0.0035 259 2454
TWN Dec-94 -0.0003 0.0007 268 2213 0.0041 ** 0.0020 259 2106
THA Dec-94 -0.0009 0.0028 268 2094 0.0028 0.0065 259 2006
Data set Eastern Europe Consensus Forecasts
CZE May-98 0.0025 *** 0.0006 173 2239 0.0081 *** 0.0021 164 2116
HUN May-98 0.0010 0.0014 173 1797 0.0024 0.0047 164 1708
POL May-98 0.0009 0.0011 173 2232 0.0034 0.0036 164 2097
TUR May-98 -0.0050 0.0033 149 1670 -0.0017 0.0079 144 1485
SVK May-98 0.0016 0.0010 173 1434 0.0074 *** 0.0026 164 1355
Data set Latin American Consensus Forecasts
ARG Apr-01 0.0105 0.0078 192 2769 0.0132 0.0173 183 2279
BRA Apr-01 -0.0009 0.0018 192 3204 -0.0059 0.0054 183 2974
CHL Apr-01 0.0008 0.0011 190 2865 0.0062 * 0.0037 183 2723
MEX Apr-01 0.0023 * 0.0014 192 3379 0.0048 0.0030 183 3183
VEN Apr-01 0.0052 0.0056 192 1718 0.0148 0.0110 183 1537
Accept hyp 1 & 4 28 out of 34 21 out of 34
We run the regression ( tai,t+h − θ) = b + ei,t+h. The table shows the estimates for b̂ and its
standard deviation corrected for serial correlation σ̂b following Petersen (2009). h is the forecast
horizon, either 3 months or 12 months. NT is the total number of observations in the cross-
section and over time. T is the number of time periods. While the sample ends in June 2017,
the individual starting time for each country is given next to the country’s codename. For
further details, see Table 7. Accept hyp 1 & 4 shows the total number of countries for which we
accept the null of unbiased actions (reported forecasts) on the 95%-level. If reported forecasts are
unbiased, we accept the MS and the Veldkamp (2011) model. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01,
using σ̂b.
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Table 3: Yields’ test of Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 4
h=3 h=12
b̂ σ̂b T NT b̂ σ̂b T NT
Data set Western Consensus Forecasts
USA Oct-89 0.0020 *** 0.0006 330 7964 0.0066 *** 0.0013 321 7527
JPN Jan-90 0.0013 *** 0.0004 330 5692 0.0051 *** 0.0009 321 5180
DEU Oct-89 0.0017 *** 0.0006 330 7939 0.0061 *** 0.0014 321 7642
FRA Oct-89 0.0014 *** 0.0006 330 5191 0.0051 *** 0.0014 321 5008
GBR Oct-89 0.0017 *** 0.0006 330 7132 0.0056 *** 0.0015 321 6883
ITA Oct-89 0.0004 0.0009 315 3073 0.0034 0.0024 315 3050
CAN Oct-89 0.0020 *** 0.0006 283 4033 0.0060 *** 0.0016 283 4018
NLD Jan-95 0.0020 *** 0.0006 267 2262 0.0070 *** 0.0015 258 2173
NOR Jun-98 0.0017 *** 0.0007 226 1570 0.0060 *** 0.0020 217 1509
ESP Jan-95 0.0016 ** 0.0008 267 3144 0.0061 ** 0.0028 258 3016
SWE Jan-95 0.0029 *** 0.0007 267 3061 0.0090 *** 0.0018 258 2945
CHE Jun-98 0.0020 *** 0.0006 226 2460 0.0062 *** 0.0014 217 2338
Data set Asia Pacific Consensus Forecasts
AUS Nov-90 0.0024 *** 0.0007 270 4176 0.0063 *** 0.0017 270 4060
IND Dec-94 -0.0002 0.0010 136 1021 -0.0006 0.0016 127 867
IDN Dec-94 0.0001 0.0017 133 893 0.0008 0.0058 124 810
NZL Dec-94 0.0018 *** 0.0007 268 3203 0.0050 *** 0.0016 259 3089
KOR Dec-94 0.0019 * 0.0010 64 433 0.0075 *** 0.0019 55 379
TWN Mar-06 0.0013 *** 0.0005 101 664 0.0042 *** 0.0017 92 600
THA Dec-94 0.0013 0.0009 133 834 0.0058 *** 0.0012 124 761
Data set Eastern Europe Consensus Forecasts
CZE Jan-06 0.0018 * 0.0010 127 1429 0.0068 *** 0.0024 118 1312
HUN Jan-06 -0.0005 0.0014 127 1155 -0.0003 0.0054 118 1046
POL Jan-06 0.0002 0.0010 127 1361 0.0024 0.0027 118 1232
SVK Jan-06 0.0006 0.0013 123 807 0.0053 * 0.0031 118 776
Accept hyp 1 & 4 9 out of 23 6 out of 23
We run the regression ( tai,t+h − θ) = b + ei,t+h. The table shows the estimates for b̂ and its
standard deviation corrected for serial correlation σ̂b following Petersen (2009). h is the forecast
horizon, either 3 months or 12 months. NT is the total number of observations in the cross-
section and time. T is the number of time periods. While the sample ends in June 2017, the
individual starting time for each country is given next to country’s codename. For further
details, see Table 8. Accept hyp 1 & 4 shows the total number of countries for which we
accept the null of unbiased actions (reported forecasts) on the 95%-level. If reported forecasts
are unbiased, we accept the MS and the Veldkamp (2011) model. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01, using σ̂b.
29
6.2 Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 states that higher precision in public signals increases welfare. As
such, we calculate the variance ratio V, which was explained in Subsection 3.1.4,
as
V =
V
[
( t a¯t+h − θt+h)
]
V
[
( tai,t+h − t a¯t+h)
] = α/β
(1− r)2
corrected for autocorrelation in action errors and deviations from the mean ac-
tions using estimates of the MA-processes.33
Hypothesis 2 is borne out when 2 < V. We perform an F-test with the null
V0 = 2 and the alternative VA > 2. The results, denoted as P2 and F2, are re-
ported in Table 4 for interest rates and in Table 5 for yields. F2 indicates the
F-statistics and P2 denotes their p-values for the null to be true. If P2 is equal to
or less than 0.10, we reject the null and accept the alternative that V is greater
than 2. In other words, if P2 is equal or below 0.10, then we conclude that higher
precision in public signals increases welfare not only in the Veldkamp (2011)
model but also in the MS model. However, if P2 is greater than 0.10, we cannot
draw a conclusion for the effect of the precision of public signals on social wel-
fare.
As inferred from Table 4, the results indicate that for almost half of the countries
in our sample (15 of 34), higher precision in public signals increases welfare for
interest rates at the 3-month forecast horizon. Hypothesis 2 finds support for
interest rate forecasts in both horizons in France, Italy, Hong Kong, India, Philip-
pines, and Argentina. For yields (Table 5), we cannot draw a clear conclusion.
6.3 Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 5
Hypothesis 3 asks whether the public signal is less precise than the private sig-
nal. Hypothesis 5 states that higher precision in private signals increases wel-
fare. Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 5 hold if V < 1. We perform an F-test with
the null V0 = 1 and the alternative VA < 1. The test procedure is as in Subsec-
tion 6.2.34 Rejecting the null indicates that the public signal is less precise than
33 For further details, see Appendix D.
34 For additional details, see Appendix D.
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the private signal. In addition, it also suggests that higher precision in private
signals is not only socially beneficial in the MS model but also in the model of
Veldkamp (2011). However, if the evidence points towards accepting the null,
we cannot assess the signal that is more precise. Additionally, if we accept the
null, we cannot draw any conclusions about welfare.
Table 4 presents the results for interest rates, Table 5 for yields. F3&5 shows the
F-statistics for Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 5, with the null V0 = 1 and the
alternative VA < 1. P3&5 shows its p-value. If P3&5 ≤ 0.10, we reject the null
and accept the alternatives. This indicates that Hypothesis 3: The private signal
is more precise than the public and Hypothesis 5: Higher precision in private
signals is socially beneficial.
We find empirical support for both hypotheses in only four countries for re-
ported interest rate forecasts at the 12-month horizon. For yields, these hy-
potheses are not confirmed by the data (in no countries at the 3-month horizon
and only in two countries at 12-month horizon).35
Note that the MS variance ratio V = (α/β)/(1− r)2 is often smaller at the 12-
month forecast horizon than at the 3-month forecast horizon. This indicates that
either the precision of the public signal (α) is lower, the precision of the private
signal (β) is higher, or coordination r is lower at the 12-month horizon than the
3-month horizon (ceteris paribus).36 The variance ratio in the Veldkamp (2011)
model equals V = α/β. This indicates that either the precision of the public sig-
nal (α) is lower, or the precision of the private signal (β) is higher at the 12-month
horizon than the 3-month horizon (ceteris paribus).
In sum, the tests of the hypotheses deliver the following messages. First, both
models are empirically applicable for short-term interest rates, specifically across
a short forecast horizon. Second, more precise public signals, for example
greater central bank transparency about short-term interest rates, increase wel-
fare. Third, whether public signals are less precise than private signals remains
an open question.
35 Robustness checks using sub-periods before and after August 2007, which we equate with the
beginning of the financial crisis, yield similar results for most countries. They are available
upon request.
36 We thank Alex Cukierman for pointing this out.
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Table 4: Interest rates’ test of Hypothesis 2, Hypothesis 3 & Hy-
pothesis 5 – “Higher precision in public signals is welfare increas-
ing” – “Private signals are more precise than public” – “Higher
precision in private signals is socially beneficial”
h=3 h=12
V̂ F2 P2 F3&5 P3&5 V̂ F2 P2 F3&5 P3&5
Data set Western Consensus Forecasts
USA Oct-89 1.76 0.88 0.93 1.77 1.00 0.68 0.34 1.00 0.68 0.00
JPN Jan-90 2.00 1.00 0.48 2.00 1.00 1.38 0.69 1.00 1.38 1.00
DEU Oct-89 1.65 0.83 0.99 1.66 1.00 0.98 0.49 1.00 0.98 0.42
FRA Oct-89 4.50 2.26 0.00 4.51 1.00 2.71 1.36 0.00 2.72 1.00
GBR Oct-89 1.56 0.78 1.00 1.57 1.00 0.68 0.34 1.00 0.69 0.00
ITA Oct-89 4.38 2.20 0.00 4.40 1.00 2.61 1.31 0.00 2.61 1.00
CAN Oct-89 2.73 1.37 0.00 2.74 1.00 1.60 0.80 0.99 1.61 1.00
NLD Jan-95 1.85 0.93 0.78 1.86 1.00 1.44 0.72 1.00 1.44 1.00
NOR Jun-98 2.78 1.40 0.00 2.80 1.00 1.45 0.73 1.00 1.46 1.00
ESP Jan-95 1.29 0.65 1.00 1.29 1.00 1.02 0.51 1.00 1.02 0.59
SWE Jan-95 1.92 0.96 0.65 1.93 1.00 0.92 0.46 1.00 0.92 0.19
CHE Jun-98 2.86 1.43 0.00 2.87 1.00 1.10 0.55 1.00 1.10 0.83
Data set Asia Pacific Consensus Forecasts
AUS Nov-90 2.12 1.06 0.22 2.13 1.00 1.12 0.56 1.00 1.12 0.92
CHN Jul-03 1.83 0.92 0.74 1.84 1.00 1.16 0.58 1.00 1.17 0.91
HKG Dec-94 6.57 3.30 0.00 6.59 1.00 3.21 1.61 0.00 3.22 1.00
IND Dec-94 4.32 2.17 0.00 4.33 1.00 2.64 1.32 0.00 2.64 1.00
IDN Dec-94 1.32 0.66 1.00 1.33 1.00 1.13 0.57 1.00 1.13 0.91
MYS Dec-94 1.76 0.88 0.91 1.76 1.00 0.76 0.38 1.00 0.76 0.00
NZL Dec-94 2.35 1.18 0.03 2.36 1.00 1.11 0.56 1.00 1.12 0.89
PHL Apr-09 6.04 3.04 0.00 6.09 1.00 3.33 1.68 0.00 3.36 1.00
SGP Dec-94 1.70 0.86 0.95 1.71 1.00 1.26 0.63 1.00 1.26 1.00
KOR Dec-94 2.63 1.32 0.00 2.64 1.00 1.76 0.88 0.90 1.77 1.00
TWN Dec-94 1.40 0.70 1.00 1.40 1.00 0.78 0.39 1.00 0.79 0.01
THA Dec-94 1.77 0.89 0.89 1.78 1.00 1.38 0.69 1.00 1.39 1.00
Data set Eastern Europe Consensus Forecasts
CZE May-98 1.57 0.79 0.98 1.58 1.00 1.79 0.90 0.80 1.80 1.00
HUN May-98 2.88 1.45 0.00 2.90 1.00 1.62 0.81 0.95 1.63 1.00
POL May-98 1.46 0.73 1.00 1.47 1.00 1.46 0.74 0.99 1.47 1.00
TUR May-98 2.29 1.15 0.11 2.31 1.00 0.84 0.42 1.00 0.84 0.11
SVK May-98 4.32 2.17 0.00 4.34 1.00 1.08 0.55 1.00 1.09 0.77
Data set Latin American Consensus Forecasts
ARG Apr-01 3.15 1.58 0.00 3.17 1.00 2.48 1.24 0.02 2.49 1.00
BRA Apr-01 1.10 0.55 1.00 1.11 0.84 0.74 0.37 1.00 0.75 0.01
CHL Apr-01 4.13 2.08 0.00 4.15 1.00 1.59 0.80 0.97 1.59 1.00
MEX Apr-01 3.06 1.54 0.00 3.07 1.00 1.75 0.88 0.87 1.76 1.00
VEN Apr-01 1.29 0.65 1.00 1.30 0.99 1.00 0.50 1.00 1.01 0.53
Mean 2.60 1.49
Accept hyp 2 (3&5) 15 of 34 0 of 34 6 of 34 4 of 34
We examine V̂ = V̂1/V̂2 = V [(t a¯t+h − θt+h)] /V [(tai,t+h − t a¯t+h)], i.e. the ratio of the estimated
variance for the cross-sectional mean action error and the variance of deviations from the cross-
sectional mean action. We correct the estimates for autocorrelation using MA-processes with h + 1
lags. h is the forecast horizon, either 3 months or 12 months. We execute F-tests for Hypothesis 2,
Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 5. F2 shows the F-statistics for Hypothesis 2 with the null V0 = 2 and
the alternative VA > 2. P2 shows its p-value. If P2 ≤ 0.10, we reject the null and accept the alternative
that V > 2 on the 90%-level: “Higher precision in public signals is welfare increasing”. F3&5 shows
the F-statistics for Hypothesis 3 & Hypothesis 5 with the null V0 = 1 and the alternative VA < 1.
P3&5 shows its p-value. If P3&5 ≤ 0.10, we reject the null and accept the alternative: Hypothesis 3
“The private signal is more precise than the public” and Hypothesis 5 “Higher precision in private
signals is socially beneficial”. Degrees of freedom for the F-tests are T − h− 1 and NT − h− 1. T
and NT are listed in Table 7. Accept hyp 2 (3&5) shows the number of countries for which we
accept Hypothesis 2, Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 5 on the 90%-level.
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Table 5: Yields’ test of Hypothesis 2, Hypothesis 3 & Hypothesis 5
– “Higher precision in public signals is welfare increasing” – “Pri-
vate signals are more precise than public” – “Higher precision in
private signals is socially beneficial”
h=3 h=12
V̂ F2 P2 F3&5 P3&5 V̂ F2 P2 F3&5 P3&5
Data set Western Consensus Forecasts
USA Oct-89 1.98 0.99 0.53 1.98 1.00 1.25 0.63 1.00 1.26 1.00
JPN Jan-90 2.04 1.02 0.38 2.04 1.00 1.14 0.57 1.00 1.14 0.95
DEU Oct-89 1.85 0.93 0.82 1.85 1.00 1.68 0.84 0.98 1.69 1.00
FRA Oct-89 1.72 0.86 0.96 1.72 1.00 1.40 0.70 1.00 1.41 1.00
GBR Oct-89 1.61 0.81 1.00 1.61 1.00 1.07 0.54 1.00 1.08 0.83
ITA Oct-89 1.87 0.94 0.77 1.87 1.00 1.45 0.73 1.00 1.46 1.00
CAN Oct-89 1.46 0.73 1.00 1.47 1.00 0.93 0.47 1.00 0.94 0.24
NLD Jan-95 1.84 0.92 0.80 1.85 1.00 1.21 0.61 1.00 1.21 0.98
NOR Jun-98 1.56 0.78 0.99 1.56 1.00 1.18 0.59 1.00 1.19 0.96
ESP Jan-95 1.42 0.71 1.00 1.42 1.00 1.30 0.65 1.00 1.30 1.00
SWE Jan-95 1.61 0.81 0.99 1.62 1.00 1.17 0.59 1.00 1.18 0.96
CHE Jun-98 1.82 0.91 0.81 1.82 1.00 1.15 0.58 1.00 1.16 0.93
Data set Asia Pacific Consensus Forecasts
AUS Nov-90 1.92 0.96 0.66 1.92 1.00 1.84 0.92 0.79 1.85 1.00
IND Dec-94 1.67 0.84 0.89 1.69 1.00 0.96 0.48 1.00 0.96 0.41
IDN Dec-94 2.95 1.48 0.00 2.97 1.00 2.23 1.12 0.20 2.24 1.00
NZL Dec-94 1.43 0.72 1.00 1.43 1.00 0.97 0.49 1.00 0.98 0.41
KOR Dec-94 0.80 0.41 1.00 0.81 0.16 0.70 0.36 1.00 0.72 0.10
TWN Mar-06 1.42 0.72 0.98 1.43 0.99 0.74 0.38 1.00 0.75 0.06
THA Dec-94 2.02 1.02 0.43 2.04 1.00 1.32 0.66 1.00 1.33 0.98
Data set Eastern Europe Consensus Forecasts
CZE Jan-06 2.43 1.22 0.06 2.44 1.00 1.63 0.82 0.90 1.65 1.00
HUN Jan-06 2.40 1.21 0.07 2.42 1.00 1.28 0.65 1.00 1.29 0.97
POL Jan-06 1.91 0.96 0.59 1.93 1.00 0.92 0.47 1.00 0.93 0.33
SVK Jan-06 1.02 0.51 1.00 1.03 0.59 0.85 0.43 1.00 0.85 0.15
Mean 1.77 1.23
Accept hyp 2 (3 & 5) 3 of 23 0 of 23 0 of 23 2 of 23
We examine V̂ = V̂1/V̂2 = V [(t a¯t+h − θt+h)] /V [(tai,t+h − t a¯t+h)], i.e. the ratio of the estimated vari-
ance for the cross-sectional mean action error and the variance of deviations from the cross-sectional
mean action. We correct the estimates for autocorrelation using MA-processes with h + 1 lags. h is
the forecast horizon, either 3 months or 12 months. We execute F-tests for Hypothesis 2, Hypoth-
esis 3 and Hypothesis 5. F2 shows the F-statistics for Hypothesis 2 with the null V0 = 2 and the
alternative VA > 2. P2 shows its p-value. If P2 ≤ 0.10, we reject the null and accept the alternative
that V > 2: “Higher precision in public signals is welfare increasing”. F3&5 shows the F-statistics
for Hypothesis 3 & Hypothesis 5 with the null V0 = 1 and the alternative VA < 1 on the 90%-level.
P3&5 shows its p-value. If P3&5 ≤ 0.10, we reject the null and accept the alternative: Hypothesis 3
“The private signal is more precise than the public” and Hypothesis 5 “Higher precision in private
signals is socially beneficial”. Degrees of freedom for the F-tests are T− h− 1 and NT− h− 1. T and
NT are listed in Table 7. Accept hyp 2 (3 & 5) shows the number of countries for which we accept
Hypothesis 2, Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 5 on the 90%-level.
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6.4 Case study of Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 5 – forward
guidance vs publication of the central banks’ internal in-
terest rate forecasts
In this subsection, we check whether forward guidance or the publication of
central banks’ internal interest rate forecasts affected the relative precision of the
public signal. As such, we further investigate Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 5.
Six central banks used forward guidance according to Charbonneau & Rennison
(2015) – the Bank of Japan from Apr-1999 to Jul-2000 and Oct-2010 to Mar-2013,
the Fed from Dec-2008 to Jun-2017, the Bank of Canada from Apr-2009 to Apr-
2010, the Riksbank from Apr-2009 to Jul-2010 and Feb-2013 to Dec-2014, the
ECB (we use DEU) from Jul-2013 to Jun-2017, and the Bank of England from
Aug-2013 to Jun-2017.
Following Svensson (2015), there are five countries in our sample whose central
banks published their internal interest rate forecasts – New Zealand from Jun-
1997, Norway from Nov-2005, Sweden from Feb-2007, the Czech Republic from
Jan-2008, and the US from Jan-2012.
In addition, we use Switzerland (CHE) and Hong Kong (HKG) as counterfac-
tual for countries that had a zero lower bound (ZLB) – equated with interest
rates < 0.5% – that did not publish their internal interest rate forecasts or resort
to forward guidance. Note that forward guidance as an unconventional mone-
tary policy instrument is closely tied to the ZLB. The ZLB period also coincided
with the publication of the internal interest rate forecasts. The counterfactual al-
lows us to distinguish between the publication of internal interest rates, forward
guidance and the ZLB. The Swiss National Bank’s ZLB period is from Feb-2009
onwards, while Hong Kong Monetary Authority’s ZLB period lasted from May-
2009 to Dec-2015.
For each country, we focus on the reported short-term interest rate forecasts with
a 3-month horizon due to the direct effect of central banks on short-term rates.
We estimate V for the sub-periods under forward guidance, the publication of
internal interest rate forecasts and ZLB periods and compare these with esti-
mates for the periods without forward guidance.
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Table 6 reports the results. The top panel shows that during forward guidance
periods, we can accept Hypothesis 3 that the public signal is significantly less
precise than the private signal in the US and the UK. For the periods in which
forward guidance was not effective, we have no evidence that the public signal
was less precise than the private signal in any country.37 A public signal that
is less precise than the private signal leads to the acceptance of Hypothesis 5:
Higher precision in private signals is socially beneficial.
The middle panel of Table 6 compares the results for periods with and without
publications of internal interest rate forecasts. Only for the US and the Czech
Republic is the public signal significantly less precise than the private signal.
However, in the US, the period of publication of interest rate forecasts overlaps
with the period for forward guidance. Because forward guidance was initiated
before the publication of internal rate forecasts, this finding suggests that for-
ward guidance, and not the publication of rate forecasts, contributed to public
signals in the US becoming less precise than private signals. We conclude that
there is only evidence that the publication of internal interest rate forecasts made
the public signal less precise than the private signal in the Czech Republic.
The bottom panel of Table 6 shows the results for the ZLB constraint. Based
on Switzerland and Hong Kong with ZLB periods combined with neither pub-
lication of internal interest rate forecasts nor forward guidance, we cannot draw
conclusions about relative precision in the two signals during the ZLB periods.
In summary, there are three emerging conclusions. First, forward guidance peri-
ods are characterized by public signals that are less precise than private signals,
which indicates that higher precision in private signals is socially beneficial. Sec-
ond, we can barely assess the relative precision in the signals associated with the
publication of internal interest rate forecasts. Third, during the ZLB constraint,
we cannot draw clear conclusions about the relative precision of signals.
37 In a related paper (Lustenberger & Rossi (2017)), we estimate central bank transparency and
communication as well as the effectiveness of forward guidance on private sector forecasts. We
found that forward guidance had no significant effect on the accuracy of consensus forecasts
for interest rates. However, it improved the accuracy of consensus forecasts of yields in some
countries. By contrast, forward guidance appears to decrease the dispersion of interest rate
forecasts, but did not affect the dispersion of yield forecasts.
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Table 6: Interest rate forecasts with 3-month forecast horizon – Forward guid-
ance vs central banks’ publication of internal interest rate forecasts
total sample no forward guidance forward guidance
V̂ F3&5 P3&5 T NT V̂ F3&5 P3&5 T NT V̂ F3&5 P3&5 T NT
USA Oct-89 1.76 1.77 1.00 330 7846 1.77 1.78 1.00 231 5422 0.37 0.37* 0.00 99 2424
JPN Jan-90 2.00 2.00 1.00 330 4965 2.10 2.11 1.00 292 4516 0.95 0.97 0.49 38 449
DEU Oct-89 1.65 1.66 1.00 330 7892 1.66 1.66 1.00 286 6946 1.37 1.41 0.95 44 946
GBR Oct-89 1.56 1.57 1.00 330 7695 1.63 1.64 1.00 287 6939 0.44 0.45* 0.00 43 756
CAN Oct-89 2.73 2.74 1.00 330 4819 2.74 2.75 1.00 321 4704 0.32 0.39 0.15 9 115
SWE Jan-95 1.92 1.93 1.00 267 2900 1.95 1.96 1.00 236 2616 0.74 0.76 0.20 31 284
total sample no publication publication
V̂ F3&5 P3&5 T NT V̂ F3&5 P3&5 T NT V̂ F3&5 P3&5 T NT
USA Oct-89 1.76 1.77 1.00 330 7846 1.74 1.75 1.00 268 6277 0.43 0.44* 0.00 62 1569
NOR Jan-90 2.78 2.80 1.00 226 1702 3.08 3.11 1.00 90 820 2.23 2.25 1.00 136 882
SWE Oct-89 1.92 1.93 1.00 267 2900 1.97 1.98 1.00 146 1691 1.51 1.52 1.00 121 1209
NZL Jun-98 2.35 2.36 1.00 268 3203 2.24 2.32 1.00 31 388 2.64 2.65 1.00 237 2815
CZE Jan-95 1.57 1.58 1.00 173 2239 2.71 2.75 1.00 63 934 0.69 0.70* 0.01 110 1305
total sample no ZLB ZLB
V̂ F3&5 P3&5 T NT V̂ F3&5 P3&5 T NT V̂ F3&5 P3&5 T NT
CHE Jun-98 2.86 2.87 1.00 226 2407 2.71 2.73 1.00 129 1319 2.11 2.13 1.00 97 1088
HKG Dec-94 6.57 6.59 1.00 268 2935 7.10 7.14 1.00 192 2240 0.96 0.97 0.45 76 695
We examine V̂ = V̂1/V̂2 = V [(t a¯t+h − θt+h)] /V [(tai,t+h − t a¯t+h)], that is the ratio of the estimated variance for the cross-sectional
mean action error and the variance of deviations from the cross-sectional mean action. We correct the estimates for autocorrelation
using MA-processes with 3 + 1 lags, since the forecast horizon is 3 months. We execute F-tests for Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 5.
F3&5 shows the F-statistics for Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 5 with the null V0 = 1 and the alternative VA < 1. P3&5 shows its
p-value. If P3&5 ≤ 0.10, we reject the null and accept the alternative V < 1 (* indicates acceptance of the alternative on the 90%-level ):
“The public signal is less precise than the private signal” and, additionally, in the Veldkamp (2011) case “Higher precision in private
signals is socially beneficial”. Degrees of freedom for the F-tests are T − h − 1 and NT − h − 1, where NT is the total number of
observations. We run the F-test for the total sample, which starts by the date shown next to countrycodes and ends in Jun-2017,
and two subsamples, one with no forward guidance and the other with forward guidance (top panel). We also run the F-test for
the period with central banks’ interest rate forecast publications and without (middle panel). Finally, we run the F-test for periods
without and with ZLB constraints (bottom panel). Forward guidance: We use Charbonneau & Rennison (2015) as source for countries
with forward guidance, the USA from Dec-2008 to Jun-2017, JPN from Apr-1999 to Jul-2000 and from Oct-2010 to Mar-2013, ECB (we
use reported forecast from DEU) from Jul-2013 to Jun-2017, GBR from Aug-2013 to Jun-2017, CAN from Apr-2009 to Apr-2010, and
SWE from Apr-2009 to Jul-2010 and Feb-2013 to Dec-2014. Publication: Publication indicates if a country’s central bank publishes
its internal interest rate forecasts based on Svensson (2015). Countries are the USA from Jan-2012, NOR from Nov-2005, SWE from
Feb-2007, NZL from Jun-1997, and CZE from Jan-2008. Zero lower bound (ZLB): We use CHE and HKG as counterfactual for
countries which reached the ZLB (interest rate < 0.5%) but did neither introduce forward guidance nor publish their internal interest
rate forecasts. ZLB period for CHE is from Feb-2009 onwards and for HKG from May-2009 to Dec-2015.
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7 Properties of public and private signals
In this section we derive two empirical properties of the signals. The first is
related to the question as to whether public signals crowd out private signals in
the MS model. The second is associated with the speed with which the agents
correct errors that are contained in the two signals.
7.1 What is the maximum weight for private signals in the MS
model?
Based on MS, we define κ as the measure of the weight that is given to the
private signal
κ =
β(1− r)
α + β(1− r) (30)
and (1− κ) as the measure of the weight that is given to the public signal
(1− κ) = α
α + β(1− r) (31)
We can formulate κ as a function of V (and r)38
κ =
1
(1 + V(1− r)) (32)
We take the limits of r (i.e. r → 0 and r → 1). The results for extreme κ values are
reported in Table 11 for interest rates and yields.39 The results are very similar.
The maximum weight attached to the private signal is obtained when r = 0. The
mean across countries for the maximum weight given to the private signal is 0.31
(0.37) for interest rates (yields) at the 3-month forecast horizon and 0.43 (0.46)
at the 12-month horizon.40 This indicates that at least approximately two-thirds
of action errors are from public signals.41 Hence, in the extreme scenario of no
coordination (r = 0), Svensson’s (2006) benchmark case of equal signal precision
(α/β = 1 leading to κ = 0.5) holds only weakly.
38 See Appendix A.2.4 for its derivation.
39 See Appendix C.
40 In fact, for interest rates, κ at the 3-month horizon is lower than κ at the 12-month horizon
with only two exceptions (CZE and POL). For yields, this is always the case.
41 For interest rates 1− 0.5 · (0.31 + 0.43) = 0.63 and yields 1− 0.5 · (0.37 + 0.46) = 0.58
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7.2 How quickly do agents correct errors in the signals?
In the previous subsection, we obtained a high proportion of action errors from
public signals. This subsection explores how quickly agents correct past errors
in the signals over time. As such, we calculate averages of MA-estimates across
countries for each time lag (1 to 4 and 13, respectively). Figure 5 (interest rates)
and Figure 6 (yields) plot the average MA-estimates for each time lag. They
suggest that agents rapidly correct errors in the private signal, while errors in
the public signal extend over the entire forecast horizon.42 This corroborates our
assumption that agents use forecasts from the last period (t− 1) as public signals
for the current period (t). An error in the private signal from the last period
continues in the public signal until the action error materializes. In addition, the
plots show that using an MA(4) or MA(13) process for action errors adequately
describes the data. The coefficients are decreasing and the estimate at lag 4 (13)
is very low and close to 0.
8 Conclusions
We are the first to derive and empirically test three hypotheses that originate
from the Morris & Shin (2002) beauty-contest model. In addition, we performed
two tests for the non-beauty contest model that was provided by Veldkamp
(2011). As such, we compiled a comprehensive data set that included more than
340,000 forecasts of short-term interest rates and long-term yields across several
geographical areas from the late 1980s to June 2017. This data is very useful for
our purpose. As documented in the strategic forecast literature, forecasters play
a game with each other. This allows us to interpret reported forecasts as actions
in this type of game, from which we derive testable implications. Three primary
results emerge from our analysis.
1) We find that most countries produce unbiased interest rate forecasts. This is
consistent with both models. By contrast, reported yield forecasts are biased and
inconsistent with both models.
2) In half of the countries, higher precision in public information induces higher
social welfare for interest rates at a 3-month horizon for the Veldkamp (2011)
model as well as the MS model. For these countries, the intriguing theoretical
42 For the 12-month forecast horizon, we detect spikes in MA processes for both interest rates
and yields.
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possibility of MS may not apply, which supports Svensson (2006)’s critique that
they fare better with more precise public information.
3) It is almost impossible to assess the relative precision of public to private
signals. However, limiting the analysis to episodes in which there has been for-
ward guidance, we find that it tends to be characterized by less precise public
signals compared to private signals. In a Veldkamp (2011) type of model, it
is implied that higher precision in private information always increases social
welfare. Thus, when forward guidance is in force, higher precision in private
information increases welfare regardless of the model. This also indicates that
if forward guidance is understood to be a measure for increasing the precision
of public information, our results cast doubts on its effectiveness as a monetary
policy instrument in times when there is a binding ZLB constraint.
Future research could use forecasts of other variables, such as the CPI. In addi-
tion, studies should examine which of the four types of economies that Angele-
tos & Pavan (2007) identified is more successful for matching the data. Future
contributions could also focus on developing a general empirical test for the
types of models that were analyzed in this paper using other utility and welfare
specifications. Furthermore, it is debatable whether higher precision in public
information is tantamount to greater central bank transparency, as is commonly
posited in the literature. This is also a possible avenue for future research. A
related question could be how to achieve more precision in private information.
Finally, a detailed analysis of how signals are structured over time could also be
a promising line for future work.
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Appendix A Theoretical definitions, identities and deriva-
tions
Appendix A.1 Definition of a beauty contest
For the definition of a beauty contest, we follow Angeletos & Pavan (2007). The
utility function is u(ai, a¯, σa, θ) and the welfare function is provided by
W(a¯, σa, θ) = u(a¯, a¯, σa, θ) +
1
2
uaiaiσ
2
a
ai is agent i’s action, a¯ is the mean and σa is the dispersion of actions. Angeletos
& Pavan (2007) use the following identities
ω0 =
−uai(0, 0, 0, 0)
uaiai + uai a¯
ω∗0 =
−Wa¯(0, 0, 0)
uaiai + 2uai a¯ + ua¯a¯
ω1 =
−uaiθ
uaiai + uai a¯
ω∗1 =
−Wa¯θ
uaiai + 2uai a¯ + ua¯a¯
λ =
uai a¯
−uaiai
λ∗ = 1− uaiai + 2uai a¯ + ua¯a¯
uaiai + uσaσa
with ω = ω0 +ω1θ and ω∗ = ω∗0 +ω∗1θ, and define a beauty contest as
ω = ω∗ and λ > 0 = λ∗
According Angeletos & Pavan (2007), λ corresponds to the equilibrium degree of
coordination, while λ∗ is the socially optimal degree of coordination.
Appendix A.1.1 MS as a beauty contest
In the MS model we have
ui(ai, a¯, σa, θ) = −(1− r)(ai − θ)2 − r(ai − a¯)2 + rσ2a
and, therefore uai = −2(1− r)(ai − θ)− 2r(ai − a¯), uaiai = −2, uai a¯ = 2r, uaiθ =
2(1− r), ua¯ = 2r(ai − a¯), ua¯a¯ = −2r, uσa = 2rσa, and uσaσa = 2r, leading to the
welfare function
W(a¯, σa, θ) = −(1− r)(a¯− θ)2 − (1− r)σ2a
with Wa¯ = −2(1− r)(a¯− θ) and Wa¯θ = 2(1− r). In contrast to MS, we refrain from
normalizing (without a loss of generality) the welfare function for this proof
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with 1/(1− r). Using the identities and the definition of a beauty contest that is
presented in Appendix A.1, we obtain
ω0 =
−0
−2 + 2r = 0 ω
∗
0 =
0
−2 + 2 · 2r− 2r = 0
ω1 =
−2(1− r)
−2 + 2r = 1 ω
∗
1 =
−2(1− r)
−2 + 2 · 2r− 2r = 1
λ =
2r
−(−2) = r λ
∗ = 1− −2 + 2 · 2r− 2r−2 + 2r = 0
Clearly, MS is a beauty contest model because it satisfies ω = ω∗ and λ > 0 = λ∗.
Appendix A.1.2 Veldkamp (2011) as a non-beauty contest
In the Veldkamp (2011) model we have
ui(ai, a¯, σa, θ) = −(1− r)(ai − θ)2 − rσ2a
and, therefore uai = −2(1− r)(ai − θ), uaiai = −2(1− r), uai a¯ = 0, uaiθ = 2(1− r),
ua¯ = 0, ua¯a¯ = 0, uσa = −2rσa, and uσaσa = −2r. This leads to the welfare function
W(a¯, σa, θ) = −(1− r)(a¯− θ)2 − σ2a
with Wa¯ = −2(1 − r)(a¯ − θ) and Wa¯θ = 2(1 − r). Using the identities and the
definition of a beauty contest that is presented in Appendix A.1, we obtain
ω0 =
−0
−2(1− r) + 0 = 0 ω
∗
0 =
−0
−2(1− r) + 2 · 0 + 0 = 0
ω1 =
−2(1− r)
−2(1− r) + 0 = 1 ω
∗
1 =
−2(1− r)
−2(1− r) + 2 · 0 + 0 = 1
λ =
0
−(−2(1− r)) = 0 λ
∗ = 1− −2(1− r) + 2 · 0 + 0−2(1− r)− 2r
= 1− −2(1− r)−2 = 1− (1− r) = r
Because ω = ω∗ but λ = 0 and λ∗ = r > 0, we conclude that the Veldkamp (2011)
model does not correspond to a beauty-contest framework.
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Appendix A.2 Derivation of theoretical identities in the MS model
Appendix A.2.1 Mean action errors and action error variances
Derivation of Equation (5): Ex-post cross-sectional mean action error
a¯− θ = 1
N
N
∑
i=1
[ ai − θ]
=
1
N
N
∑
i=1
[
α
α + β(1− r) · η +
β(1− r)
α + β(1− r) · εi
]
=
α
α + β(1− r) · η (33)
because εi ∼ iidN(0, 1/β), but η is (ex-post) the same for all agents at a specific
point in time.
Derivation of Equation (6): Expected action error of agent i
E [ai − θ] = E
[
α
α + β(1− r) · η +
β(1− r)
α + β(1− r) · εi
]
= 0 (34)
since εi ∼ iidN(0, 1/β) and η ∼ iidN(0, 1/α).
Derivation of Equation (7): Expected cross-sectional mean action error
E [a¯− θ] = E
[
α
α + β(1− r) · η
]
= 0 (35)
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Appendix A.2.2 Variance ratio V
Derivation of Equation (8): The variance of the ex-post cross-sectional mean
action errors is given by
V1 = V
[
(a¯− θ)
]
= V
[
α
α + β(1− r) · η
]
= E
[(
α
α + β(1− r) · η
)2]
−
=0︷ ︸︸ ︷(
E
[
α
α + β(1− r) · η
])2
=
(
α
α + β(1− r)
)2
·E
[
η2
]
=
α2
(α + β(1− r))2 ·
1
α
=
α
(α + β(1− r))2 (36)
Derivation of Equation (9): The ex-post individual action error component (error
contained in the private signal) is
ai − θ = αα + β(1− r) · η +
β(1− r)
α + β(1− r) · εi
= (a¯− θ) + β(1− r)
α + β(1− r) · εi
⇔ (ai − θ)− (a¯− θ) = β(1− r)α + β(1− r) · εi
ai − a¯ = β(1− r)α + β(1− r) · εi (37)
Derivation of Equation (10): The variance of agents’ deviation from the cross-
sectional mean action follows as
V2 = V
[
(tai − a¯)
]
= V
[
β(1− r)
α + β(1− r) · εi
]
= E
[(
β(1− r)
α + β(1− r) · εi
)2]
−
=0︷ ︸︸ ︷(
E
[
β(1− r)
α + β(1− r) · εi
])2
=
(
β(1− r)
α + β(1− r)
)2
·E
[
ε2i
]
=
β2(1− r)2
(α + β(1− r))2 ·
1
β
=
β(1− r)2
(α + β(1− r))2 (38)
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Derivation of Equation (11) and Equation (12): The variance ratio is defined as
V =
V1
V2
=
α
(α+β(1−r))2
β(1−r)2
(α+β(1−r))2
=
α
β(1− r)2
⇔ α/β = V · (1− r)2 (39)
Appendix A.2.3 Svensson’s conditions related to V
Connecting Svensson’s conditions to the variance ratio V (Equation (15))
α/β = V · (1− r)2 S (2r− 1)(1− r)
⇔ V S (2r− 1)/(1− r) (40)
Appendix A.2.4 Ranges for κ
We derive ranges for the weight that is given to the private signal κ. As such,
we present κ as function of r and then let r go to its limits 0 and 1, that is, the
boundary values of r that are provided by MS. We begin with the definition of
the weight that is given to the private signal, κ. MS define this as
κ =
β(1− r)
α + β(1− r) (41)
(1− κ) = α
α + β(1− r) (42)
Equation (41) and Equation (42) into Equation (4) leads to
ai − θ = αα + β(1− r) · η +
β(1− r)
α + β(1− r) · εi
= (1− κ) · ηt + κ · εi (43)
Therefore, from Equation (41), Equation (42), Equation (8) and Equation (10)
κ2 =
β2(1− r)2
(α + β(1− r))2 = β ·
β(1− r)2
(α + β(1− r))2 = β ·V2 (44)
(1− κ)2 = α
2
(α + β(1− r))2 = α ·
α
(α + β(1− r))2 = α ·V1 (45)
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Dividing Equation (45) by Equation (44) and using Equation (12)
(1− κ)2
κ2
=
α
β
V1
V2
= V(1− r)2V = V2(1− r)2
⇔ 1− κ
κ
= V(1− r)
⇔ 1 = V(1− r)κ + κ
1 = κ (V(1− r) + 1)
⇔ κ = 1
(1 + V(1− r)) (46)
Before we can take the limit of Equation (46), we must check if V converges to a
constant.
lim
r→0
V = lim
r→0
α
β(1− r)2 = α/β (47)
lim
r→1
V = lim
r→1
α
β(1− r)2 = ∞ (48)
Taking the limits of Equation (46) for r yields
lim
r→0
κ =
1
V + 1
=
1
α/β + 1
(49)
lim
r→1
κ = 0 (50)
Appendix A.2.5 Proper priors and theoretical identities
Veldkamp (2011) shows that with proper priors, the optimal action taken by
agent i equals
ai =
τ
τ + α + β(1− r) · µ +
α + β(1− r)
τ + α + β(1− r) · θ
+
α
τ + α + β(1− r) · η +
β(1− r)
τ + α + β(1− r)εi (51)
where the prior equals θ ∼ iidN (µ, 1/τ).
Rearranging Equation (51), we derive the action error
ai − θ = ττ + α + β(1− r) · (µ− θ)
+
α
τ + α + β(1− r) · η +
β(1− r)
τ + α + β(1− r)εi (52)
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The ex-post cross-sectional mean action error equals
a¯− θ = τ
τ + α + β(1− r) · (µ− θ)
+
α
τ + α + β(1− r) · η (53)
The expected action error of agent i and the expected cross-sectional mean action
error are
E [ai − θ] = 0 (54)
E [a¯− θ] = 0 (55)
The variance follows as
V [a¯− θ] =
(
τ
τ + α + β(1− r)
)2
·V [µ− θ]
+
(
α
τ + α + β(1− r)
)2
· 1/α
=
(
τ
τ + α + β(1− r)
)2
· 1/τ
+
(
α
τ + α + β(1− r)
)2
· 1/α
=
τ + α
(τ + α + β(1− r))2 (56)
Agents’ deviation from the cross-sectional mean action equals
ai − a¯ = β(1− r)τ + α + β(1− r) · εi (57)
The variance follows as
V [ai − a¯] =
(
β(1− r)
τ + α + β(1− r)
)2
· 1/β
=
β(1− r)2
(τ + α + β(1− r))2 (58)
The variance ratio of the public to the private signal follows from Equation (56)
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and Equation (58).
V =
τ+α
(τ+α+β(1−r))2
β(1−r)2
(τ+α+β(1−r))2
=
τ + α
β(1− r)2 (59)
We see that what was the precision of the public signal (α) has now become the
common prior and the precision of the public signal (τ + α). The prior is common
knowledge and, therefore, is also a type of public signal. The variance ratio re-
mains the same. In addition, Veldkamp (2011) shows that the theoretical results
of MS also hold under proper priors. For simplicity, we use the improper prior in
the calculations. However, as shown, our results call for the same interpretation
as the proper prior framework.
Appendix A.3 Derivation of theoretical identities in the Veld-
kamp (2011) model
Appendix A.3.1 Mean action errors and action error variances
Derivation of Equation (20): Cross-sectional ex-post mean action error
a¯− θ = 1
N
N
∑
i=1
[ ai − θ]
=
1
N
N
∑
i=1
[
α
α + β
· η + β
α + β
· εi
]
=
α
α + β
· η (60)
since εi ∼ iidN(0, 1/β), but η is (ex post) the same for all agents at a specific
point in time.
Derivation of Equation (21): Expected action error for agent i
E [ai − θ] = E
[
α
α + β
· η + β
α + β
· εi
]
= 0 (61)
since εi ∼ iidN(0, 1/β) and η ∼ iidN(0, 1/α).
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Derivation of Equation (22): Expected cross-sectional mean action error
E [a¯− θ] = E
[
α
α + β
· η
]
= 0 (62)
Appendix A.3.2 Variance ratio V
Derivation of Equation (23): The variance of the ex-post cross-sectional mean
action errors is given by
V1 = V
[
(a¯− θ)
]
= V
[
α
α + β
· η
]
= E
[(
α
α + β
· η
)2]
−
=0︷ ︸︸ ︷(
E
[
α
α + β
· η
])2
=
(
α
α + β
)2
·E
[
η2
]
=
α2
(α + β)2
· 1
α
=
α
(α + β)2
(63)
Derivation of Equation (24): The ex-post individual action error component (error
contained in the private signal) is
ai − θ = αα + β · η +
β
α + β
· εi
= (a¯− θ) + β
α + β
· εi
⇔ (ai − θ)− (a¯− θ) = βα + β · εi
ai − a¯ = βα + β · εi (64)
Derivation of Equation (25): The variance of agents’ deviation from the cross-
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sectional mean action follows as
V2 = V
[
(ai − a¯)
]
= V
[
β
α + β
· εi
]
= E
[(
β
α + β
· εi
)2]
−
=0︷ ︸︸ ︷(
E
[
β
α + β
· εi
])2
=
(
β
α + β
)2
·E
[
ε2i
]
=
β2
(α + β)2
· 1
β
=
β
(α + β)2
(65)
Derivation of Equation (26): The variance ratio is defined as
1/V =
V2
V1
=
β
(α+β)2
α
(α+β)2
=
β
α
(66)
Derivation of Equation (27): Using Equation (17) and Equation (19) welfare
writes
E [W (a¯, σa, θ) |θ] = E
[
−(1− r) · 1
N
N
∑
i=1
(
α
α + β
· η + β
α + β
· εi
)2
− r · σ2a
]
= −(1− r) · 1
α + β
− r · β
(α + β)2
(67)
Derivation of Equation (28): Taking the first derivative of Equation (27) with
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respect to β
∂E [W (a¯, σa, θ) |θ]
∂β
= (1− r) · 1
(α + β)2
− r · (α + β)
2 − 2β(α + β)
(α + β)4
= (1− r) · α + β
(α + β)3
− r · α + β− 2β
(α + β)3
=
(1− r)(α + β)− r(α + β) + 2rβ
(α + β)3
=
α + β− rα− rβ− rα− rβ + 2rβ
(α + β)3
=
α + β− rα− rα
(α + β)3
=
α(1− 2r) + β
(α + β)3
=
β− α(2r− 1)
(α + β)3
(68)
Appendix A.3.3 Proper priors and theoretical identities
Appendix A.2.5 shows that the variance ratio does not depend on whether we
assume proper or improper priors in the MS model. The same result holds in
the Veldkamp (2011) model. We refrain from showing this finding as the proof
is similar to Appendix A.2.5.
Appendix B Data description and sources
We perform the tests with log-transformed data
tai,t+h = log
[
1 + t
aˆi,t+h
100
]
(69)
θt+h = log
[
1 +
θˆt+h
100
]
(70)
where the reported forecast t aˆi,t+h and the realization θˆt+h are observed. t is
the time period in which an action (reported forecast) is formed, while h is the
forecast horizon. i indexes the forecasters.
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Table 7: Observations for reported short-term interest rate fore-
casts
h=3 h=12
Start T N¯t NTotal NT Start T N¯t NTotal NT
Data set Consensus Forecasts
USA Oct-89 330 23.8 76.0 7846 Oct-89 321 23.4 76 7501
JPN Oct-89 330 15.0 50.0 4965 Oct-89 321 14.3 50 4580
DEU Oct-89 330 23.9 53.0 7892 Oct-89 321 23.7 52 7614
FRA Oct-89 330 15.9 52.0 5261 Oct-89 321 15.7 52 5049
GBR Oct-89 330 23.3 74.0 7695 Oct-89 321 23.4 71 7508
ITA Oct-89 330 9.9 39.0 3282 Oct-89 321 9.9 39 3162
CAN Oct-89 330 14.6 42.0 4819 Oct-89 321 14.6 41 4676
NLD Jan-95 267 8.7 33.0 2331 Jan-95 258 8.7 33 2242
NOR Jun-98 226 7.5 28.0 1702 Jun-98 217 7.6 27 1639
ESP Jan-95 267 12.2 30.0 3248 Jan-95 258 12.1 30 3110
SWE Jan-95 267 10.9 35.0 2900 Jan-95 258 10.9 34 2801
CHE Jun-98 226 10.7 20.0 2407 Jun-98 217 10.5 20 2286
Data set Asia Pacific Consensus Forecasts
AUS Nov-90 317 15.3 46.0 4849 Nov-90 308 15.0 46 4610
CHN Jul-03 165 9.8 32.0 1611 Jul-03 156 9.7 32 1510
HKG Dec-94 268 11.0 47.0 2935 Dec-94 259 10.8 48 2810
IND Dec-94 268 6.7 46.0 1788 Dec-94 259 6.0 46 1562
IDN Dec-94 268 6.5 45.0 1734 Dec-94 259 6.5 45 1680
MYS Dec-94 268 10.5 52.0 2816 Dec-94 259 10.4 53 2700
NZL Dec-94 268 12.0 30.0 3203 Dec-94 259 11.9 30 3082
PHL Apr-09 92 2.9 15.0 263 Apr-09 83 2.5 13 207
SGP Dec-94 268 10.1 44.0 2698 Dec-94 259 10.1 44 2615
KOR Dec-94 268 9.6 38.0 2569 Dec-94 259 9.5 38 2454
TWN Dec-94 268 8.3 40.0 2213 Dec-94 259 8.1 40 2106
THA Dec-94 268 7.8 48.0 2094 Dec-94 259 7.7 48 2006
Data set Eastern Europe Consensus Forecasts
CZE May-98 173 12.9 41.0 2239 May-98 164 12.9 41 2116
HUN May-98 173 10.4 37.0 1797 May-98 164 10.4 37 1708
POL May-98 173 12.9 45.0 2232 May-98 164 12.8 44 2097
TUR May-02 149 11.2 46.0 1670 Sep-01 144 10.3 46 1485
SVK May-98 173 8.3 30.0 1434 May-98 164 8.3 30 1355
Data set Latin American Consensus Forecasts
ARG Apr-01 192 14.4 51.0 2769 Apr-01 183 12.5 44 2279
BRA Apr-01 192 16.7 49.0 3204 Apr-01 183 16.3 48 2974
CHL Jun-01 190 15.1 38.0 2865 Apr-01 183 14.9 39 2723
MEX Apr-01 192 17.6 50.0 3379 Apr-01 183 17.4 50 3183
VEN Apr-01 192 8.9 28.0 1718 Apr-01 183 8.4 25 1537
Total 106,428 100,967
This Table summarizes the number of individual forecasts for short-term interest rates per country.
Start is the begin of the sample for a country. All samples end in June 2017. T is the number of time
periods (months). N¯t is the average number of forecasts at a point in time (the cross-section). NTotal
is the total number of different forecasters. NT gives the total number of individual forecasts. h
indicates the forecast horizon, either 3 months or 12 months.
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Table 8: Observations for reported long-term yield forecasts
h=3 h=12
Start T N¯t NTotal NT Start T N¯t NTotal NT
Data set Consensus Forecasts
USA Oct-89 330 24.1 76 7964 Oct-89 321 23.4 76 7527
JPN Oct-89 330 17.2 50 5692 Oct-89 321 16.1 50 5180
DEU Oct-89 330 24.1 52 7939 Oct-89 321 23.8 51 7642
FRA Oct-89 330 15.7 52 5191 Oct-89 321 15.6 52 5008
GBR Oct-89 330 21.6 74 7132 Oct-89 321 21.4 70 6883
ITA Jan-91 315 9.8 39 3073 Apr-90 315 9.7 39 3050
CAN Sep-93 283 14.3 40 4033 Dec-92 283 14.2 39 4018
NLD Jan-95 267 8.5 32 2262 Jan-95 258 8.4 32 2173
NOR Jun-98 226 6.9 29 1570 Jun-98 217 7.0 27 1509
ESP Jan-95 267 11.8 30 3144 Jan-95 258 11.7 30 3016
SWE Jan-95 267 11.5 35 3061 Jan-95 258 11.4 34 2945
CHE Jun-98 226 10.9 19 2460 Jun-98 217 10.8 19 2338
Data set Asia Pacific Consensus Forecasts
AUS Oct-94 270 15.5 40 4176 Jan-94 270 15.0 40 4060
IND Dec-05 136 7.5 29 1021 Dec-05 127 6.8 28 867
IDN Mar-06 133 6.7 20 893 Mar-06 124 6.5 20 810
NZL Dec-94 268 12.0 30 3203 Dec-94 259 11.9 30 3089
KOR Dec-11 64 6.8 16 433 Dec-11 55 6.9 16 379
TWN Mar-06 101 6.6 18 664 Mar-06 92 6.5 16 600
THA Mar-06 133 6.3 21 834 Mar-06 124 6.1 21 761
Data set Eastern Europe Consensus Forecasts
CZE Jan-06 127 11.3 29 1429 Jan-06 118 11.1 27 1312
HUN Jan-06 127 9.1 27 1155 Jan-06 118 8.9 26 1046
POL Jan-06 127 10.7 30 1361 Jan-06 118 10.4 28 1232
SVK Sep-06 123 6.6 17 807 Jan-06 118 6.6 17 776
Total 69,497 66,221
This Table summarizes the number of individual forecasts for long-term yields per country.
Start is the begin of the sample for a country. All samples end in June 2017. T is the num-
ber of time periods (months). N¯t is the average number of forecasts at a point in time (the
cross-section). NTotal is the total number of different forecasters. NT gives the total number of
individual forecasts. h indicates the forecast horizon, either 3 months or 12 months.
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Appendix C Further results
Table 11: Interest rates and yields – Max-
imum weights given to the private signal
Interest rates Yields
h = 3 h = 12 h = 3 h = 12
Data set Western Consensus Forecasts
USA 0.36 0.60 0.34 0.44
JPN 0.33 0.42 0.33 0.47
DEU 0.38 0.51 0.35 0.37
FRA 0.18 0.27 0.37 0.42
GBR 0.39 0.59 0.38 0.48
ITA 0.19 0.28 0.35 0.41
CAN 0.27 0.38 0.41 0.52
NLD 0.35 0.41 0.35 0.45
NOR 0.26 0.41 0.39 0.46
ESP 0.44 0.50 0.41 0.44
SWE 0.34 0.52 0.38 0.46
CHE 0.26 0.48 0.35 0.46
Data set Asia Pacific Consensus Forecasts
AUS 0.32 0.47 0.34 0.35
CHN 0.35 0.46
HKG 0.13 0.24
IND 0.19 0.28 0.37 0.51
IDN 0.43 0.47 0.25 0.31
MYS 0.36 0.57
NZL 0.30 0.47 0.41 0.51
PHL 0.14 0.23
SGP 0.37 0.44
KOR 0.28 0.36 0.56 0.59
TWN 0.42 0.56 0.41 0.57
THA 0.36 0.42 0.33 0.43
Data set Eastern Europe Consensus Forecasts
CZE 0.39 0.36 0.29 0.38
HUN 0.26 0.38 0.29 0.44
POL 0.41 0.41 0.34 0.52
TUR 0.30 0.54
SVK 0.19 0.48 0.50 0.54
Data set Latin American Consensus Forecasts
ARG 0.24 0.29
BRA 0.48 0.57
CHL 0.19 0.39
MEX 0.25 0.36
VEN 0.44 0.50
Mean 0.31 0.43 0.37 0.46
The table shows the maximum weight given to the private
signal (κ when r → 0) while the minimum weight is always 0
(this is when r → 1). h is the forecast horizon, either 3 months
or 12 months.
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Appendix D Empirical methods
Appendix D.1 Method for testing Hypothesis 1 and Hypothe-
sis 4: Fama & MacBeth (1973)
To test Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 4, we run the following regression
tai,t+h − θt+h = b + ei,t+h (71)
As such, we apply the Fama & MacBeth (1973) approach. The estimate is
bˆ =
1
T
T
∑
t=1
bˆt =
1
T
T
∑
t=1
(
∑Nti=1 Xi,tYi,t
∑Nti=1 X
2
i,t
)
(72)
The variance of the coefficients is
σˆ2b,c =
1
T
T
∑
t=1
(
bˆt − bˆ
)2
T
(73)
Note that we divide by 1/T2 because we are estimating sample means. This is
the variance of the coefficients when there is no serial correlation. However, this
is not the case in our data set. A forecast (action) that is reported today corre-
lates with at least the lags of the forecast horizon because agents cannot learn
their action errors before they have materialized. As shown in Figure 3, there is
a forecaster’s effect (’firm’s effect’) that leads to a variance that is too low. How-
ever, we assume that this effect only applies until the forecaster has identified
the misspecification in his reported forecasts. We chose 4 lags of serial correla-
tion when the forecast horizon is 3 months (h = 3) and 13 lags for horizons of 12
months (h = 12). Petersen (2009) suggests the following method for correcting
for serial correlation
σˆ2b = σˆ
2
b,c + 2 ·
1
T
h+1
∑
j=1
COV
(
bˆt, bˆt−j
)
(74)
We could also introduce a HAC estimator with weights for the lags, for example
Newey & West, among others. However, this would lead to smaller variance
estimates (assuming positive correlations among lags). Therefore, we use σˆ2b as
an upper estimate of the variance for bˆ.
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Appendix D.2 Method to test Hypothesis 2, Hypothesis 3, and
Hypothesis 5
To test Hypothesis 2, Hypothesis 3, and Hypothesis 5, we estimate two vari-
ances and calculate their ratio
V̂ =
V̂1
V̂2
=
V
[
(t a¯t+h − θt+h)
]
V
[
(tai,t+h − t a¯t+h)
] (75)
Because action errors are correlated over the forecast horizon, we correct for this
when estimating the variance. In both models, action errors arise from errors
that are contained in the signals. Errors in private (εi,t) and public (ηt) signals
cannot be completely determined by agents until the action error materializes.
Therefore, errors may survive in the signals until the realization of the state
(θt+h). Thus, both models explain the correlation of action errors across forecast
horizons. To correct for this issue, we calculate MA(4) and MA(13) processes for
forecast horizons of 3 and 12 months, which yields43
t a¯t+h − θt+h = φ1et−1 + φ2et−2 + ... + φh+1et−h−1 + et (76)
tai,t+h − t a¯t+h = φ1et−1 + φ2et−2 + ... + φh+1et−h−1 + et (77)
We use the estimated variance of the innovations in the MA-processes σ̂2e as the
estimates of variances V̂1 and V̂2.
From F-tests, we accept Hypothesis 2, Hypothesis 3, and Hypothesis 5. Fol-
lowing Forbes et al. (2010) (p. 105), we know that the ratio of two estimated
variances for iid normally distributed variables follow an F distribution. This is
V̂
V0
(T − h− 1) · (NT − h− 2)
(T − h− 2) · (NT − h− 1) ∼ F (T − h− 1, NT − h− 1) ,
with NT =
T
∑
t=1
Nt (78)
where V0 represents the null. We subtract h + 1 from the numbers of observations
because we lose h + 1 observations due to estimating the MA(h+1)-processes.
43 In fact, forecast errors from stationary, trend-stationary, and unit root processes follow MA(h)
processes. (See, for example, Hamilton (1994), p. 440 ff.). It is fair to assume that action errors
that are made by the participants in the Consensus Economics survey follow this pattern. Hence,
the individual action error follows an MA(h+1) process. We conclude that the cross-sectional
mean action error follows an MA(h+1) process. Note that we derive individual deviations from
the cross-sectional mean action as follows tai,t+h − θt+h − ( t a¯t+h − θt+h) = tai,t+h − t a¯t+h. We
deduce that tai,t+h − t a¯t+h (individual deviations from the cross-sectional mean action) also
follow an MA(h+1) process, because the cross-sectional sum of two MA(h+1) processes follows
an MA(h+1) process.
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Appendix E Figures
Figure 4: F(r) as a boundary for V
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The figure illustrates the conditions that were postulated by Svensson (2006). It plots the function
F(r) = (2r− 1)/(1− r) for 0 < r < 0.8 (the blue line). F(r) is a boundary for V. If 0 < V ≤ F(r),
it could be that a higher precision in public signals lowers social welfare. Welfare, then, only
depends on r. The blue shaded area shows the values of V, for which higher precision in public
signals decreases social welfare. This occurs when 0.5 < r < 0.75. However, if 2 < V, we can
rule out a welfare reducing effect from higher precision in public signals. Further, note that the
ratio V = V [(t a¯t+h − θt+h)] /V [(tai,t+h − t a¯t+h)] cannot be negative, because it is a ratio of two
variances. The orange shaded area shows possible values of V ∈ R∗+.
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Figure 5: Interest rates: Average MA estimates
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The figure plots the average MA-estimates for each lag.
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Figure 6: Yields: Average MA estimates
0 1 2 3 4
Lag q
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Av
er
ag
e 
M
A-
es
tim
at
es
 a
t l
ag
 q
Forecast horizon of 3 months
public signal error
private signal error
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Lag q
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Av
er
ag
e 
M
A-
es
tim
at
es
 a
t l
ag
 q
Forecast horizon of 12 months
public signal error
private signal error
The figure plots the average MA-estimates for each lag.
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